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
19 May 1993



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JPRS Report

Arms Control



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CONTENTS

19 May 1993

CHINA

Beijing on North Korean Nuclear Issue	1
Foreign Ministry Welcomes DPRK-U.S. Talks [XINHUA, 6 May 93]	1
UN Rep Urges Continued Efforts for World Disarmament [XINHUA, 10 May 93]	1

EAST ASIA

NORTH KOREA

Pyongyang Responds Angrily to UN Resolution	2
UN Ambassador Addresses Security Council [Pyongyang radio, 13 May 93]	2
Envoy to China Holds News Conference [China Radio Int'l, 13 May 93]	3
NODONG SINMUN Commentary [Pyongyang radio, 14 May 93]	3
KCNA Calls UN Resolution 'Unjust' [KCNA, 14 May 93]	4
UN Envoy Speaks Out [KCNA, 14 May 93]	5
North Korean Press on the Defense	5
Daily Says U.S. Is 'Biggest Nuclear Threat' [KCNA, 9 May 93]	5
Call for U.S.-DPRK Talks [KCNA, 8 May 93]	6
Current Global Nuclear Situation Criticized [Pyongyang radio, 9 May 93]	6
YONHAP Carries 'Full Text' of UN 'Draft Resolution' on DPRK [YONHAP, 8 May 93]	8

SOUTH KOREA

Seoul on DPRK Nuclear Issue	9
Will Seek Arms Control Talks [YONHAP, 10 May 93]	9
Foreign Ministry 'Reasonably Pleased' by UN Resolution [Yi Tong-min; YONHAP, 12 May 93]	9
ROK Position on Inspections, Sanctions [YONHAP, 12 May 93]	10

NEW ZEALAND

Government Opposed To 'Any Nation' Resuming Nuclear Testing [AFP, 17 May 93]	10
--	----

EAST EUROPE

POLAND

Former Soviet Nuclear Weapon Sites in Poland [K. Dubinski; PRAWO I ZYCIE, 24 Apr 93]	11
--	----

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Egyptian Delegation Arrives in Washington for Disarmament Talks [MENA, 17 May 93]	13
---	----

INDIA

Daily Discusses 'Ambiguity' of Nuclear Issue [Bhabani Sen Gupta; THE HINDUSTAN TIMES, 30 Apr 93]	13
---	----

IRAN

Official on Iran's Security Policy	14
--	----

Denies Interest in Weapons of Mass Destruction	
[Dr. Hamid Reza 'Asefi interview; TEHRAN TIMES, 5 May 93]	14
Quoted by Russian Media [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 7 May 93]	15

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

GENERAL

Recent Ukrainian Moves on Nuclear Issue	16
Rukh Chairman Interviewed by German Daily	
[Vyacheslav Chornovil interview; BERLINER ZEITUNG, 3 May 93]	16
Decision To Abide by 1980 Nuclear Materials Convention [Kiev radio, 5 May 93]	16
Parliamentarian Confers With British Envoy [Kiev radio, 5 May 93]	17
Politician Promotes New Plan for Nonnuclear Status	
[V. Skachko; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 6 May 93]	17
Ukraine Hosts U.S. Ambassador Talbott	17
Arrives for Talks on Nuclear Disarmament [Moscow radio, 9 May 93]	17
UNIA Reports [UNIA, 10 May 93]	18
Russian Paper Offers View [V. Skachko; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 12 May 93]	18
New U.S. Tactic Seen [A. Sychev; IZVESTIYA, 13 May 93]	19
Russian Daily on Talbott's Nuclear Arms Mediation Offer	
[V. Zasulskiy; KOMMERSANT-DAILY, 12 May 93]	19
Transcript of Reagan-Gorbachev Summit in Reykjavik	
[MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, Apr 93]	20
Russian Commentary Questions Sales of Nuclear Materials	
[Petr Below; ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 8 May 93]	25

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

Party Leader on Conditions for Ratifying START I [Kiev radio, 11 May 93]	26
Russian Plans Initiated To Phase Out Obsolete Missiles [ITAR-TASS, 13 May 93]	26
Russian Commander on Strategic Missile Update Program	
[Igor Sergeyev interview; IZVESTIYA, 14 May 93]	27
Secretary Christopher Cited on START II Ratification	
[M. Pogorelyy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 13 May 93]	29
Ukrainian, Russian Officials on Strategic Arms [FEDERATSIYA, 17 Apr 93]	29
Moscow Media Assesses Ukrainian Actions	32
Pro-Nuclear Ukrainian Republican Party Viewed	
[V. Skachko; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 6 May 93]	32
Commentary Says Ukraine's Nuclear Weapons Threaten Planet	
[A. Gerasimov; Moscow tv, 6 May 93]	32
France To Aid Ukraine With Nuclear Safety, Investment [UKRINFORM, 8 May 93]	33
Ukrainian Official in Warsaw Talks to Reporters About START	
[M. Leczycka; POLSKA ZBROJNA, 4 May 93]	33
U.S. Envoy Warns Ukraine of Possible 'International Isolation'	
[A. Golub; PRAVDA, 14 May 93]	34
Magazine Devotes Issue to Criticism of START II	34
Reader Questions Russian Motives [G. Rydanov; DEN, 1 May 93]	34
START II Said To Discriminate Against Russia	
[V. Dmitriyev, G. Melkov; DEN, 1 May 93]	34
START II, Global Protection System Scored [Igor Ivanov; DEN, 1 May 93]	38
Ownership of Heptyl Missile Fuel in Question [Pavel Felgengauer; SEGODNYA, 13 Apr 93]	40
Sverodvinsk Bans Nuclear Subs From Entering Port [V. Loyter; Moscow tv, 16 May 93]	40
Retired Russian Admiral on Submarine Deterrent and START II	
[Radiy Zubkov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 5 May 93]	40

SDI, SPACE ARMS, GLOBAL DEFENSE

Russia Comments on SDI	42
Foreign Ministry Spokesman Welcomes Aspin Statement [ITAR-TASS, 16 May 93]	42
Commentary Says 'Step in the Right Direction' [Y. Solton; Moscow radio, 17 May 93]	42

Russian Parliament Sets Space Policy [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 12 May 93]	43
Russian Decree on Space Science and Industry [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 12 May 93]	44
Interstate Space Council Discusses Cooperation in Kiev [O. Petrunya; UKRINFORM, 12 May 93]	45
Ukraine Joins World Space Agency Forum [Kiev radio, 10 May 93]	45

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Russia's Flanks Seen Weakened by CFE Treaty [Pavel Felgengauer; SEGODNYA, 7 May 93]	45
Estonian Report on Talks With Russia on Military Withdrawal [Tallinn radio, 12 May 93]	46
Latvian-Russian Cooperation Back on Track	47
Russian Residency Decree Revised [BNS, 12 May 93]	47
Talks To Resume 17-20 May [BNS, 12 May 93]	47
NATO States Endorse Baltic Bid To Speed Russian Withdrawal [BNS, 12 May 93]	47
Baltics Participate in Talks With Russia [BNS, 12 May 93]	48

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Russian Conference Debates Chemical Weapons Destruction [Moscow tv, 13 May 93]	48
Estonia Ratifies Ban on Bacteriological Weapons [Tallinn radio, 5 May 93]	48
Baltic Chemical Weapons Disposal Sites Being Charted [Moscow tv, 14 May 93]	48
Environmentalists Condemn Mirzayanov Prosecution [S. Fomichev, V. Alekseyev, et al; MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, 11 Apr 93]	48

WEAPONS CONVERSION

Kurchatov Institute Involved in New 'Majestic' Projects [Moscow tv, 8 May 93]	49
NATO To Fund Ukrainian Science Projects [Kiev radio, 16 May 93]	49

WEST EUROPE

FRANCE

Paris Poised To Resume Nuclear Testing [LE MONDE, 4 May 93]	50
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Beijing on North Korean Nuclear Issue

Foreign Ministry Welcomes DPRK-U.S. Talks

OW0605083493 Beijing XINHUA in English
0822 GMT 6 May 93

[Text] Beijing, May 6 (XINHUA)—A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman today welcomed the ongoing talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States in Beijing on the nuclear inspection issue.

Spokesman Wu Jianmin made the remark at a press conference this afternoon, when asked whether China would exert pressure on DPRK to revert its position on withdrawing from the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty).

"The issue of nuclear inspection in the DPRK is more directly a matter between DPRK and the three sides of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United States and the Republic of Korea," Wu said.

China hopes that the parties concerned will find a proper settlement of the issue through dialogue and China will play a constructive role in this regard, he said.

The DPRK and the United States started talks in Beijing yesterday, he disclosed. "We welcome this and hope the talks will achieve positive results at an early date."

UN Rep Urges Continued Efforts for World Disarmament

OW1005232693 Beijing XINHUA in English
2317 GMT 10 May 93

[Text] United Nations, May 10 (XINHUA)—Chinese representative Hou Zhitong said here today that the international community must continue its efforts for the task of a comprehensive, thorough disarmament outlined in the "final document."

Speaking at the 1993 U.N. Disarmament Commission, which started on April 19 and ended today, the Chinese ambassador said that the "final document" and other documents regarding nuclear and conventional disarmament, should play a major role of guidance in disarmament in the world.

On peace and development, Hou said that the international community needs safe and stable international relations and a healthy and harmonious international environment. A new international order based on the U.N. Charter and the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence must be established.

During the 3-week session, the commission discussed the items on its agenda "a regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security," "the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields," and "the process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security."

The commission completed work on the regional disarmament and will continue consideration of the other two items at next year's session.

NORTH KOREA

Pyongyang Responds Angrily to UN Resolution

UN Ambassador Addresses Security Council

*SK1305152693 Pyongyang Korean Central
Broadcasting Network in Korean 1308 GMT 13 May 93*

[Text] Pak Kil-yon, ambassador at the DPRK permanent mission to the United Nations, made a speech at the UN Security Council in New York on 11 May.

In the speech he stressed that our withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] and the issues raised in fulfilling the Nuclear Safeguards Accord cannot destroy peace and security in the world and threaten the security of any other country.

He said: The United States' draft resolution, which has been distributed to this meeting, is designed to infringe upon our nation's sovereign rights and to stifle our socialist system. Therefore, we resolutely reject the draft resolution submitted to the UN Security Council because it is an unjust draft that violates the UN Charter stipulating the sovereignty of its member states and the regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA].

The basic factor that forced us to withdraw from the NPT is the U.S. maneuvering to intensify its nuclear threat to the DPRK and to disarm our country by forcing it to open its military sites, by manipulating some circles of the IAEA.

The United States, going against affirmative steps taken by the DPRK to join the NPT and to fulfill the safeguards accord, intensified the nuclear threat against us while leaving intact and maintaining nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea.

Through six rounds of nonregular inspections [pijonggi sachal], our country proved that our nuclear activity is aimed at peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, the United States and some circles in the IAEA fabricated the issue of inconsistency and maneuvered to justify it.

Under the plan to open our military sites, the United States offered slanderous intelligence material and satellite photographs to the IAEA and adopted a resolution to label us as a state that is not complying with the safeguards accord by instigating some circles in the IAEA. Thus, the United States brought this resolution to the UN Security Council.

This illustrates that the very ones who are not complying with the safeguards accord are not us but the United States and some circles in the IAEA Secretariat being manipulated by United States.

Ignoring the IAEA regulations on observing neutrality and impartiality and keeping secret, some circles of the IAEA systematically turned over our inspection results to hostile countries, including the United States.

The United States manipulated the IAEA's inspection of our country from the very beginning. The United States forced the IAEA's director-general, who attended a joint hearing of the U.S. Senate and Congress on 22 July 1992, to conduct a special inspection [tukpyol sachal]—a surprise inspection [kisup sachal]—of us.

A sovereign state has the right to refuse a special inspection demanded by the IAEA. It cannot be noncompliance with the safeguards accord.

The IAEA regulations have no article stipulating that one should open sites the IAEA considers suspicious to the inspectors. The inspection of suspicious sites demanded by the IAEA is a plot to open our military sites based on intelligence material and satellite data offered by the United States.

The United Nations has no legal and technical grounds to discuss the issue of our noncompliance with the safeguards accord. The resolution adopted at the IAEA's Board of Governors meeting was an unjust resolution which distorted the situation according to U.S. manipulation.

Our nation's withdrawal from the NPT is an issue pertaining to our sovereign rights and is the right we preserve according to the treaty.

Therefore, our nuclear issue is not an issue to be discussed at the UN Security Council. Some officials of the IAEA Secretariat are seriously infringing upon the sovereign right of our country, a nonnuclear state, by applying a double-standard policy and following the United States. Applying the double-standard policy on our country is unreasonable to the extreme.

We joined the NPT to have U.S. nuclear weapons withdrawn from South Korea and eliminate nuclear threat in conformity with the NPT's idea and purpose. However, the IAEA is giving tacit approval to U.S. actions violating the NPT without uttering a word.

The IAEA is not taking any measures against South Korea, which is actively promoting the development of nuclear weapons under the nuclear umbrella of the United States and Japan, which is accelerating preparations for becoming a big nuclear power. If some officials of the IAEA Secretariat allow the application of the double-standard policy, the big nuclear powers will be able to ridicule the nonnuclear states' fate at will and will unhesitatingly commit acts that infringe upon their sovereign right.

Today, they are threatening our sovereign right by applying the double-standard policy on our country, but tomorrow another nonnuclear state can be the target. Because of our sincere efforts to resolve the nuclear issue through negotiations, an agreement in principle was reached on carrying out negotiations between the IAEA and us. However, for the UN Security Council to adopt a resolution infringing upon our sovereign right at a time when we are scheduled to hold DPRK-U.S. high-level

talks, is an act of neglecting the purpose of the UN Charter, IAEA regulations, and international law, which is to resolve issues of dispute through dialogue and negotiations. It is also an act of giving tacit approval to the forcible measures of a big nuclear power.

If the UN Security Council adopts the U.S. resolution on forcing inspection of our military sites, this will infringe upon our sovereign right, make the situation on the Korean peninsula extremely tense, and result in a threat to Asia as well as world peace and security.

If the UN Security Council gives tacit approval to the forcible measures of the big nuclear power, the nonnuclear states and Third World countries will no longer be able to trust the current UN Security Council. If the UN Security Council works to contribute to peace and security on the Korean peninsula in accordance with its mission, we should find a way to resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula fairly before putting pressure on our country, a nonnuclear state, and take measures that will be of practical help.

If the UN Security Council ignores the principle of fairness and adopts the unreasonable resolution which puts pressure on us, it will be inevitable for us to take self-defensive measures. The nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula can be resolved only through negotiations between the United States and us. Because the United States deployed nuclear weapons in South Korea, the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula was born. Also, our nuclear issue emerged because the U.S. forces created suspicion about our nuclear development.

This issue cannot be resolved by putting pressure or sanctions on the other side at the demand of the United States, the opponent country. History shows that if a dispute is aggravated it can ultimately lead to armed conflict.

The adoption of the resolution infringing upon our sovereign right by the forced measures of the United States will aggravate the situation on the Korean peninsula, and furthermore, it can result in unpredictable events.

Envoy to China Holds News Conference

*SK1405020293 Beijing China Radio International
in Korean 1100 GMT 13 May 93*

[Text] DPRK Ambassador to China Chu Chang-chun held a news conference at his embassy in China on the morning of 13 May. He expressed the DPRK Government's position on the adoption of the resolution adopted at the UN Security Council concerning its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT].

Ambassador Chu said in his conference: Either joining or withdrawing from international treaties is an issue relating to each country's sovereign right. The DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT is a self-defensive step that has been taken under the emergency situation in which our

country's supreme interest is gravely threatened. The DPRK Government regards the UN Security Council's resolution intervention in its internal affairs as a grave infringement upon its sovereign right. Therefore, it strongly opposes it.

In reporters' questions concerning DPRK-Russian relations in the future, Ambassador Chu said: The DPRK will continue friendly relations with all countries which love independence, friendship, and peace. Russia is no exception as well.

He said concerning relations between the DPRK and China: DPRK-Chinese relations are good now and will be also good in the future as it has been in the past.

NODONG SINMUN Commentary

*SK1405023093 Pyongyang Korean Central
Broadcasting Network in Korean 0033 GMT 14 May 93*

[NODONG SINMUN 14 May commentary: "We Will Never Accept it"]

[Text] Attempts for injustice to hamper justice have been openly committed in the international arena. The UN Security Council [UNSC] has adopted a so-called resolution under the pretext of our Republic's step to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT]. This is a typical example of the attempt. The resolution demanded that the DPRK abide by the Nuclear Safeguards Accord, and that it reconsider its withdrawal from the NPT.

Our people regard the UNSC resolution as tragic and unjust and, therefore, strongly reject it. This resolution is intended to shamelessly interfere in our Republic's internal affairs and to flagrantly infringe upon our Republic's sovereign rights.

Either joining or withdrawing from international treaties are the issues related to each country's sovereign rights. We joined the NPT according to our own determination not someone's enforcement. The DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT is a self-defensive step taken under the grave situation in which our nation's sovereign rights and our country's supreme interests are infringed upon. Therefore, this is the just and fair exercise of our sovereign rights that cannot be the subject of international discussions. No one can pick a fight with us concerning it.

The United States and some member countries of the UNSC which are following it, are, nevertheless, pressuring us and regarding us as nuclear criminals. This is aimed at impinging on our people's dignity, infringing upon our nation's sovereign rights, and, furthermore, trampling upon our country's supreme interests by interfering in our Republic's internal affairs. How can we disregard this act!

Our people value independence as their life. We will never accept others' infringement upon our country's sovereign rights under the pretext of a fictitious nuclear

problem. We have stressed it so many times. We have even demonstrated it through our practices and acts. Our nuclear problem was discussed at a place where it should be not discussed. We don't want to be the victim of the double-standard application. This is also another reason why we reject the UNSC resolution.

As our country's Foreign Ministry spokesman noted in his recent statement, our nuclear issue is not an issue to be discussed at the UNSC. Accordingly, the United Nations has no legal right or reason to adopt any resolution on the issue.

The target to be focused in discussions over our nuclear issue is the United States, not us. Because it is none other than the United States that made us withdraw from the NPT.

Instead of fulfilling its duty as a signatory of the treaty, the United States has given us severe nuclear threats and forced the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] to adopt the resolution on special inspections of two sites [taesang], which have no relation to nuclear activities, with the purpose of disarming us by using some quarters of the IAEA Secretariat.

The United States is an offender, and the DPRK is a victim. If it is based on the principle of impartiality, the UNSC should naturally punish the United States, an offender, not us, a victim.

The UNSC, however, acted just in the opposite direction. In other words, the UNSC has lost its fairness and become a stage on which a double-standard policy can be applied.

The UNSC conducted a wrongdoing against our country today, and it can adopt such an unjust resolution opposing another country tomorrow. Taking this into account, what country in the world can trust the United Nations?

The United States was the originator of the recent UNSC resolution, and some countries agreed to it. This shows that they do not really want the resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.

The nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula cannot be resolved by forced measures or by pressure. It can be settled out only through negotiations.

Since negotiations between us and the IAEA developed, irregular inspection teams of the IAEA have visited our country, and DPRK-U.S. negotiations are being discussed.

In early April, the UNSC chairman's statement said that the UNSC would force negotiations to be held. The United States and its followers, however, deterred negotiations by adopting an unjust resolution through the UNSC.

If it really intends to resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, the UNSC cannot conduct such contradictory acts such as forcing negotiations yesterday and then blocking them today.

The United Nations has made another disgraceful mistake in its history by adopting the recent UNSC resolution. People of the world do remember the U.S. shameful conduct of when the United States provoked the Korean war and dispatched allied forces of 15 countries, which followed the United States, to the front of the war in the name of the United Nations by adopting an illegitimate resolution at the United Nations. The UNSC is going to take the same reckless course.

By adopting the resolution, the UNSC has revealed itself as being used by the United States, our belligerent counterpart, in its maneuver to crush our socialist system.

Any forcible measure or pressure against us can never work. If the United States and some member countries of the UNSC, which follow it, consider our position and efforts to resolve the issue through negotiations as an expression of weak-mindedness, they are making a miscalculation.

If the UNSC tries to put unjust pressure on us, such as sanctions against the DPRK, based on the resolution, we will not allow it to do so. Our people will firmly defend the country's sovereignty and remain unyielding under all pressures.

KCNA Calls UN Resolution 'Unjust'

SK1405053793 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
0506 GMT 14 May 93

["Unjust UN 'Resolution' Must Be Revoked"—KCNA headline]

[Text] *Pyongyang, May 14 (KCNA)*—The UN Security Council reportedly adopted an unjust "resolution" on May 11 calling on the DPRK to "retract the announcement of its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and permit nuclear inspections", and threatened that "other steps may have to be taken, if necessary."

This is a crude violation of the sovereignty and dignity of the DPRK and an open strongarm act designed to stifle Korean socialism.

The adoption of a "resolution" by the UN encroaching upon the sovereignty of the DPRK over its fictitious "nuclear problem" is a fatal blot on the U.N. charter.

The coercive adoption of the unjust "resolution" by the UN against the DPRK's self-defensive measure is a brigandish act which cannot go down with anyone, for the UN charter has no stipulation on taking issue with withdrawal from a treaty.

As a matter of fact, it is not the DPRK which has neither intention nor capacity to develop nuclear arms, but the United States which has deployed a large number of nuclear weapons in South Korea and threatens the DPRK at all times, that must be dealt with at the UN.

The United States, the very criminal which should be brought to justice at the UN and face sanctions from the international community, however, forced the adoption of a "resolution", acting as an "international judge" in the UN arena. This makes it plain that the "resolution" is nothing but a club brandished by a robber.

It is a big mistake if the United States thinks it can frighten the DPRK with the "resolution." No "resolution" can work on us.

The UN must renounce the "double standard" policy of putting pressure on the victim while conniving at the deed of the assailant and immediately revoke the "resolution" against the DPRK which can never be justified.

UN Envoy Speaks Out

SK1405052493 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0449 GMT 14 May 93

[Text] Pyongyang, May 14 (KCNA)—"If the United Nations Security Council adopts an unreasonable 'resolution' calling for pressure on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, ignoring the principle of impartiality, we cannot but take self-defensive measures commensurate with it," declared Pak Kil-yon, chief of the DPRK permanent mission at the United Nations, in his speech at the UN Security Council on May 11.

He categorically rejected the draft "resolution" presented by the United States to the UN Security Council for the purpose of encroaching upon the DPRK's sovereignty and stifling its socialist system because it is an unjustifiable one contravening the UN charter and the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency calling for respecting the sovereignty of the member nations.

He said:

"The DPRK's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is a matter pertaining to its sovereignty and its right under the NPT. So, our 'nuclear problem' is not a matter to be discussed at the UN Security Council.

"If some officials of the secretariat of the IAEA are allowed to apply 'double standard,' nuclear powers would twist nuclear have-nots around their little figure and unhesitatingly encroach upon their sovereignty.

"Today our country's sovereignty is threatened through the application of the 'double standard', but tomorrow other non-nuclear nations may fall a victim to it.

"The UN security council adopted a 'resolution' infringing upon our sovereignty at a time when an

agreement has been reached in principle to have negotiations between the DPRK and the IAEA and DPRK-U.S high-level negotiations is on the order of the day thanks to our sincere efforts to solve the 'nuclear problem' through negotiations. This is an act of acquiescing in 'strongarm acts' of a nuclear power, irrespective of the UN charter, the statute of the IAEA and the international law calling for solving disputes through dialogue and negotiations.

"We hold that if the UN security council wants to contribute to peace and security of the Korean peninsula in conformity with its mission, it must seek a fair solution of the 'nuclear problem' on the Korean peninsula and take steps practically conducive to it, before putting pressure on the DPRK, a non-nuclear nation.

"The 'nuclear problem' on the Korean peninsula can be solved only through negotiations between the DPRK and the United States.

"It cannot be settled by means of 'pressure' on and 'sanctions' against the DPRK demanded by the United States, a belligerent party.

"And history shows that if the dispute is deteriorated, it would lead to an armed conflict.

"The adoption of a 'resolution' encroaching upon the DPRK's sovereignty by the U.S. 'Strongarm act' may aggravate the situation of the Korean peninsula and cause an unpredictable incident."

North Korean Press on the Defense

Daily Says U.S. Is 'Biggest Nuclear Threat'

SK0905085293 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0825 GMT 9 May 93

["Source of Nuclear Threat Must be Removed"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, May 9 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN today says in a by-lined article entitled "Source of Nuclear Threat Must Be Removed" that if mankind is to be freed from nuclear threat, the very source of it must be made known clearly and nuclear weapons be removed totally and completely from the globe.

The very one that mounts the biggest nuclear threat to mankind today is none other than the United States which was the first in the world to develop and use nuclear weapons and which has a biggest stock of nuclear arms, the article says, and goes on:

In order to remove the source of nuclear threat to mankind, it is imperative to ban the testing of nuclear weapons and their production, deployment and use and reduce different types of nuclear weapons and, furthermore, to totally and completely eliminate all the nuclear weapons. Only then can mankind be freed finally from

the danger of nuclear holocaust, and world peace be preserved on a lasting basis.

Of importance here is to eliminate nuclear weapons preferentially on the part on the countries which have a largest number of nuclear weapons and actually create a nuclear threat.

The first to do so is the United States that has created nuclear threat on the globe.

If nuclear threat to mankind is to be removed, the nuclear proliferation by the United States must be stopped and the double standard be rejected thoroughly and the principle of impartiality be observed in complying with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

Japan's attempt to become a nuclear power poses another big threat to peace in Asia and the rest of the world.

In order to remove the nuclear threat to mankind, it is important to discontinue the testing of nuclear weapons and the development of new ones and get withdrawn the nuclear weapons deployed in other's territory.

In particular, it is urgently required to get all the U.S. nuclear weapons withdrawn from South Korea which is wrought with the greatest danger of nuclear war.

The nuclear threat to mankind can be removed also when nuclear weapon states cease nuclear war exercises against other countries.

The United States must no longer repeat "Team Spirit" nuclear war game on the Korean peninsula.

The world people can avert the danger of nuclear war when they have built nuclear-free, peace zones everywhere on the globe.

Call for U.S.-DPRK Talks

*SK0805111293 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1100 GMT 8 May 93*

["Nuclear Problem Can Be Solved Only Through Korea-U.S. Talks"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, May 8 (KCNA)—The DPRK-U.S. talks, if it is arranged, may discuss a series of problems of common concern with main emphasis on the practical problems for solving the nuclear problem of the Korean peninsula. The nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula must be settled peacefully through fruitful talks between the DPRK and the U.S., says MINJU CHOSON in an article headlined "Nuclear Problem Can Be Solved Only Through Korea-U.S. Talks".

As the DPRK consistently holds, the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula can be resolved only through the DPRK-U.S. talks, the author of the article says, and goes on:

It is because the United States is the very one which gave rise to the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula and this problem is made still graver today by it.

Due to the U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear war moves against the DPRK, the Korean people are facing a constant nuclear threat. This is the crux of the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula.

If the danger of a nuclear war is to be removed from the Korean peninsula and the nuclear threat against the DPRK discontinued, the United States must withdraw all the nuclear weapons from South Korea and stop nuclear war adventure. This is a problem that can be solved only by the DPRK and the U.S.

To solve the problems raised between the DPRK and the U.S. peacefully by means of negotiation can never be harmful but be beneficial to both sides, stresses the article.

Current Global Nuclear Situation Criticized

*905055693 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting
Network in Korean 0015 GMT 9 May 93*

[NODONG SINMUN 9 May special article: "Nuclear Threat Should Be Removed From Its Source"]

[Text] The imperialist ruling circles and their propaganda means are recently loudly clamoring that since nuclear weapons of superpowers are a war deterrence, they do not impose any threat. In the case of non-nuclear states, however, even suspicion of their nuclear weapons development works as a great threat. This is indeed a ridiculous claim.

Even after the collapse of the cold war structure of East-West confrontation, the imperialists' maneuvers for reinforcing nuclear arms are continuing and mankind has been unable to free itself from nuclear threat.

For mankind to free itself from nuclear threat, the source of nuclear threat must be precisely revealed and nuclear weapons must be comprehensively and completely removed from the earth.

The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song has taught: As long as there are nuclear weapons on our globe, the danger of nuclear war cannot be removed and mankind is unable to free itself from constant nuclear threat.

Nuclear threat has been imposed on mankind because nuclear weapons were developed and have been used in wars as a mass lethal means.

As long as nuclear weapons exist on the earth, the danger of nuclear war cannot be removed. Nuclear weapons are a source of disaster threatening existence and civilization of mankind.

Today the one who gives the greatest nuclear threat to mankind is the United States which developed and used nuclear weapons for the first time in the world and which possesses them most.

During World War II, the United States manufactured nuclear weapons for the first time and ded them over the heads of the Japanese, and massacred the people en masse. Thus, it committed a most atrocious crime.

For nearly half a century since then, the United States developed and manufactured on a large scale the mass lethal weapons and deployed them in many places around the world. Thus, it undisguisedly threatened and blackmailed other countries and other people.

All this fact eloquently illustrates that the United States is the very one that is increasing the nuclear threat to the world's people. Nevertheless, the United States and its followers, keeping silent on this solemn fact, fabricated fictitious nuclear suspicions of our Republic, and are running amok with a farce on so-called sanctions and so forth.

This is a stratagem designed to divert elsewhere the world people's denunciation of the United States' nuclear blackmail policy by concealing the true source of the nuclear threat imposed on mankind.

Such maneuvers by the United States are related to its arrogant way of thinking that it will not be subject to any punishment whatever crime it may commit but it can punish any nation that hurts its feelings by freely putting an unjust label on this nation.

This is a brigandish theory and tyranny of strength to trample underfoot justice and impartiality and to establish a system of the law of the jungle in the international community. The U.S. ruling circles are attempting to support such a system with nuclear weapons.

The U.S. gibberish that its nuclear weapons are a war deterrence is a sophistry designed to continue maintaining its absolute nuclear superiority, to bring other countries to its knees with nuclear blackmail and to become the world's emperor who controls the destiny of mankind. This is indeed very dangerous allegation.

If such allegation is accepted, mankind will never be able to free itself from nuclear threat and will be reduced to a slave of the United States' nuclear blackmail. No nuclear weapon can work as war deterrence. It will merely increase the danger of nuclear war and will threaten the existence of mankind and the peace of the world.

In order to remove the nuclear threat to mankind from its source, the testing, production, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons must be prohibited and various kinds of existing nuclear weapons must be reduced. Besides, all nuclear weapons must be gradually abolished comprehensively and completely.

Only by doing this, can mankind free itself from nuclear calamities finally and maintain world peace on a solid base.

What is important in this is that the nation, which possesses nuclear weapons most and actually creates nuclear threat, should begin abolishing nuclear weapons.

The first target nation is the United States which creates a nuclear threat in this world.

Today the aspirations and desire of mankind to live under peaceful, stable, and free circumstances free from the danger of nuclear war are increasing each day.

Unless one abolishes U.S. nuclear weapons completely, such desire of mankind cannot be achieved nor can the nuclear threat be removed from its source.

It is cheating for the United States to loudly talk about removing the nuclear threat without abolishing its own nuclear weapons. In order to remove the nuclear threat to mankind, nuclear proliferation by the United States should be prevented. What is important in doing so is to thoroughly reject the double standards in fulfilling obligations of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and to keep the principle of impartiality.

The United States, discarding its missions as a trustee nation of the treaty, actively supported the development of nuclear weapons by South Africa and Israel in order to make them nuclear states.

It is an undisguised secret that the United States supported the development of nuclear weapons by South Korea and Japan from a long time ago. Japan's becoming a great nuclear state imposes a new great threat to peace in Asia and the world. It is a common task of the peaceloving people in Asia and the world to prevent Japan's nuclear armament.

This being the reality, the United States, turning a deaf ear to all of this, fabricated suspicions of nuclear development in our country—a non-nuclear state—and kicked off a farce. This is a maneuver to stifle [apsal] our Republic.

In order to remove the nuclear threat to mankind, nuclear weapons testing and the development of new nuclear weapons should be suspended and nuclear weapons that have been deployed in other countries should be withdrawn.

Under the signboards of nuclear disarmament, the imperialists are continuously developing and producing new nuclear weapons, instead of reducing old nuclear weapons. That the United States has not suspended the testing of nuclear weapons is aimed at promoting offensive capabilities of nuclear weapons and at qualitatively improving the nuclear weapons system. This means an act of increasing the danger of nuclear war.

Test and development of nuclear weapons must be suspended forever. At the same time, nuclear weapons that have been deployed in other countries must be withdrawn. In particular, it has emerged as an urgent mission to force the U.S. to withdraw all nuclear weapons from South Korea where the danger of nuclear war is greatest.

To remove the nuclear threat to mankind, nuclear states should not conduct nuclear war exercise against the

other country. The United States is staging nuclear war exercise in many areas of the world. It is continuously staging a reckless nuclear war exercise in the Asian-Pacific region, in particular, on the Korean peninsula.

If a nuclear war breaks out in Korea, it will bring about numerous disasters to world people. The Team Spirit nuclear war exercise should not be staged on the Korean peninsula any longer.

It is one of the important guarantees for removing the nuclear threat to mankind and for ensuring peace to establish and expand nuclear-free, peace zones in many parts of the world. If world people establish nuclear-free, peace zones throughout the world, the danger of nuclear war can be prevented.

By putting forward reasonable proposals for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, our party and the government of the republic are actively striving to realize them.

Our people will, as ever, actively make efforts, hand in hand with peaceloving people of the world, to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, to remove nuclear threat to mankind by completely abolishing all nuclear weapons and to ensure durable peace in the world.

YONHAP Carries 'Full Text' of UN 'Draft Resolution' on DPRK

SK0805050893 Seoul YONHAP in English 0456 GMT 8 May 93

[Text] United Nations, May 7 (YONHAP)—Following is the full text of the draft resolution that was distributed to members of the United Nations security council on Friday:

Draft resolution

A.—Noting the critical importance of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (the treaty), and emphasising the integral role of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in the implementation of the treaty and in ensuring the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and reaffirming the crucial contribution which progress in non-proliferation can make to the maintenance of international peace and security;

B.—Recalling the security council presidential statement of 8 April 1993 in which the members of the council welcome all efforts aimed at resolving this situation and, in particular, encourage IAEA to continue its consultations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) for proper settlement of the nuclear verification issue in the DPRK;

C.—Recalling also the joint declaration by the DPRK and the Republic of Korea (ROK) on the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, which includes establishment of a credible and effective bilateral inspection

regime and a pledge not to possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities;

D.—Noting with satisfaction that the DPRK is party to the treaty and has concluded a fullscope safeguards agreement as required by that treaty;

E.—Having considered with regret the letter from the minister for foreign affairs of the DPRK dated 12 march 1993 addressed to the president of the council concerning the intention of the government of the DPRK to withdraw from the treaty;

F.—Having also considered with regret the IAEA Board of Governors' findings contained in its resolution of 1 April 1993 that the DPRK is in non-compliance with its obligations under the IAEA-DPRK Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/403), and that the IAEA is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear materials required to be safeguarded under the terms of the IAEA-DPRK safeguards agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

G.—Noting the 1 April 1993 statement by the Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States which questions whether the DPRK's stated reasons for withdrawing from the treaty constitute extraordinary events relating to the subject matter of the treaty;

H.—Noting the letter of reply by the DPRK to the director-general of IAEA dated April 22 which, inter alia, encourages and urges the director-general to hold consultations with the DPRK on the implementation of the safeguards agreement: Noting also that the DPRK has expressed its willingness to seek a negotiated solution to this issue;

I.—Welcoming recent signs of improved cooperation between DPRK and IAEA and the prospect of contacts between DPRK and other member states;

1. Calls upon the DPRK to reaffirm its commitment to the treaty and to retract the announcement contained in the letter of 12 March 1993:

2. Further calls upon the DPRK to honor its non-proliferation obligations under the treaty and comply with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA as specified by the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of 25 February 1993:

3. Requests the director-general of the IAEA to continue to consult with the DPRK with a view to resolving the issues which are the subject of the board of governors' findings and to report to the security council on his efforts in due time:

4. Urges all members states to encourage the DPRK to respond positively to this resolution and encourages them to take all appropriate steps to facilitate a solution:

5. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to consider further security council action if necessary.

SOUTH KOREA

Seoul on DPRK Nuclear Issue

Will Seek Arms Control Talks

SK1005030093 Seoul YONHAP in English 0139 GMT
10 May 93

[Text] Seoul, May 10 (YONHAP)—South Korea wants to start arms control talks with North Korea as soon as the nuclear problem is solved to ease tension and promote peace, a government source said Monday.

Solving the problem might not only bring broader economic cooperation with the North, including visits by businessmen and joint ventures, but also help bring substantial progress in arms control, he said.

It is the intention of President Kim Yong-sam to put aside an unnecessary arms race between the two Koreas and to realize arms reduction, peaceful coexistence and economic development, he said, adding that the government was fully prepared for disarmament talks.

The South's military inferiority had impeded efforts to give substance to arms control talks with the North but the gap would be narrowed if the nuclear factor were removed.

In this connection, the government was working on a blueprint for arms control that put top priority on reduction of offensive weapons, establishment of areas for restricted weapons deployment, and maintenance of military strength at equal levels and then reduction of arms on a gradual basis, he said.

So far, the government has taken the comparatively passive attitude of building confidence first and entering into arms control talks, but now it is shifting to an active position because an inter-Korean military balance is expected by late 1990s and has an uncomparable edge over North Korea in economic terms.

He said money saved by slowing the arms race would be used to pay for the unification of Korea.

Foreign Ministry 'Reasonably Pleased' by UN Resolution

SK1205025093 Seoul YONHAP in English 0226 GMT
12 May 93

[YONHAP "News Analysis" by Yi Tong-min: "Int'l Community Moves Along Its Track on North Korea Nuclear Issue"]

[Text] Seoul, May 12 (YONHAP)—The international community moved right along its set track Wednesday with the adoption of a Security Council resolution on North Korea.

The two-rail track has been that of both stick and carrot. The Security Council handed North Korea the first stick.

We are reasonably pleased, a Foreign Ministry official said in reaction to the resolution. But real hard work begins from here.

The resolution is expected to temporarily suspend international action on North Korea's nuclear issue and launch bilateral approach. Expected soon is a high-level meeting between North Korea and the United States. Also expected soon is resumption of inter-Korean dialogue.

The resolution, as it aimed, set the background for these negotiations. The last of the five points declares that the council decides to remain seized of the matter and to consider further security council action as necessary.

Such a declaration carries heavy weight because it is by the Security Council, which represents the global community.

Although concerned nations may approach Pyongyang with softened action, there will always be this implied threat of sanctions looming over North Korea.

The resolution showed North Korea that China, the last faithful ally, is limited in coming to Pyongyang's defense against global action when Beijing abstained from voting, adding further weight to sanction warnings.

No less significant was the fact that Brazil, which opposed strong wording in the resolution and said it would abstain, changed its mind at the last minute and voted yes.

Participation of Brazil, a non-NPT [nuclear nonproliferation treaty] member, shows the commitment of the international community to nuclear non-proliferation.

Seoul officials say efforts now will focus on bilateral negotiations. Assistant foreign minister Sin Ki-pok left for Washington last weekend for policy coordination before the North Korea-U.S. high-level contact.

Sin and U.S. officials are expected to seek face-saving measures for North Korea, giving Pyongyang just enough excuse to return to the Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty (NPT) without it showing that North Korea kneeled to international pressure.

The key face-saving measures would include downscaling of the annual South Korea-U.S. military maneuver Team Spirit and the opening of American military bases in South Korea to outside inspection in exchange for seeing the nuclear installations in North Korea.

The mood is ripe for North Korea to be positive about solving the nuclear problem, officials here say.

North Korea definitely stands to gain compared to the situation before March 12, the date Pyongyang announced it was bolting from the NPT, one Ministry official said.

Indeed, North Korea at a minimum gets high-level talks with the United States.

South Korea will also attempt negotiations with North Korea. Officials here say there are things Washington cannot give Pyongyang but Seoul can, such as economic cooperation.

North Korea's nuclear matter has temporarily left the United Nations, and officials here say it is entirely up to Pyongyang whether it goes back to the global body.

ROK Position on Inspections, Sanctions

*SK1205035193 Seoul YONHAP in English 0327 GMT
12 May 93*

[Text] Seoul, May 12 (YONHAP)—North Korea must both return to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'s special inspection if it wants to avoid U.N. sanctions, Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu said Wednesday.

It is clearly stated in the U.N. resolution that minimum requirement is for North Korea to rescind its decision to withdraw from NPT and comply with IAEA's special inspection, Han told a press conference.

The United States, in its high-level contact with North Korea, will emphasize that, in addition to these demands, Pyongyang must accept inter-Korean simultaneous inspection as well, Han said.

The foreign minister's remarks peg down South Korea's position amid suggestions within the government, given recently by Unification Minister Han Wan-sang, that North Korea's return to NPT is enough.

Yes, Han said when asked if North Korea must meet both conditions in the resolution in order to avoid international sanctions.

The U.N. Security Council adopted the resolution calling on North Korea to reconsider its decision to leave NPT.

It urged the communist regime to comply with the safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the agency's resolution demanding special inspection on two highly suspected North Korean nuclear sites.

The resolution passed with 13 yeases. China and Pakistan abstained.

Han attached special significance to the fact that China abstained, predicting that Beijing's action at the Security Council will exert powerful influence on North Korea to actively solve its nuclear problem.

China sent a strong message to North Korea by allowing the resolution to pass the Security Council. It has shown

it cannot but participate in the global movement for nuclear non-proliferation, said Han.

North Korea can no longer expect China to take its side when time comes for global sanctions against Pyongyang, said Han.

The foreign minister said the upcoming North Korea-U.S. high-level meeting will be strictly limited to the nuclear issue.

The high-level contact is within the framework of the U.N. resolution recommending all member states to encourage North Korea to comply with the resolution, he told the press conference.

There will be no new proposals or promises to be made at the contact, he said.

If Pyongyang refuses to act positively despite the first resolution, the security council is expected to take the warned additional steps before June 12 when North Korea's NPT withdrawal becomes final, according to the foreign minister.

He suggested that inter-Korean dialogue may reopen in the near future, saying the possibility has always been inherent.

We will watch the results of North Korea-U.S. contact, he said.

NEW ZEALAND

Government Opposed To 'Any Nation' Resuming Nuclear Testing

*BK1705080293 Hong Kong AFP in English 0701 GMT
17 May 93*

[Text] Wellington, May 17 (AFP)—New Zealand was opposed to any nation resuming nuclear testing, acting Prime Minister Don McKinnon said here Monday.

Speaking at a post-cabinet press conference, he said he saw any suggestion of the United States [words indistinct] resuming testing in the same light.

"We really do not want to see anyone start testing again," he said.

He said if one nuclear nation began testing again, it would be obvious that others would want to resume.

McKinnon said U.S. President Bill Clinton was under pressure from the Pentagon, but other U.S. federal agencies were opposing a resumption.

"So whilst there is this tug-of-war between agencies there, very similar to what there was in France just a couple of weeks beforehand, one hopes that the overall goodwill will prevail and that we do not see any need for that to occur."

POLAND

Former Soviet Nuclear Weapon Sites in Poland

93WC0069A Warsaw PRAWO I ZYCIE in Polish
No 17, 24 Apr 93 pp 1, 7

[Article by Krzysztof Dubinski: "The Atomic Volcano: The USSR Maintained a Nuclear Arsenal in Poland Sufficient To Annihilate 125 Hiroshima-Sized Cities"]

[Text] For more than 20 years, this was one of Moscow's most closely guarded military secrets. It was revealed only during the withdrawal of Soviet army units from our country. On 7 April 1991, the then commander of the Northern Group of USSR Troops, the late General Viktor Dubynin, admitted that nuclear weapons were stored in Poland. On 29 October 1992, after the Polish authorities took over the military base in Bornem-Sulinow, that information was officially confirmed by a representative of the Ministry of National Defense.

At three localities, Dobrow and Buszno in Koszalin Voivodship and Trzemeszno Lubuskie in Gorzow Voivodship, the Polish side took over Red Army facilities, which included concrete underground bunkers designed for nuclear bombs or warheads. They were radiologically inspected and thereupon transferred to the ownership of the Administration of State Forests. General Zdzislaw Ostrowski defined those structures as silos, which might suggest that they were stationary launch sites of nuclear-warhead-tipped missiles. However, the available information indicates that no such stationary Soviet launch sites existed on Polish territory.

In other regions where Soviet troops were stationed—for example, Sypniew in Pomerania—Polish authorities discovered facilities whose design, equipment, and protective systems indicated that they may have been storage sites for nuclear weapons.

Closest to the Front Line

The operational plans of Warsaw Pact troops for the West European theater of military operations were, like the NATO plans concerning the eastward direction, based on the assumption that the enemy would launch the first strike. The attacked side would be responsible for the counterblow. The commands of both military blocs believed that any eventual armed conflict between them could not be maintained at the level of conventional warfare and that nuclear weapons would be utilized from the very first minute.

The effectiveness of the eventual nuclear counterattack depended chiefly on the speed with which it would be waged. For tactical and operational-tactical launchers, that speed was reckoned in minutes. That is why the nuclear arsenal for those means of conveyance had to be located in direct proximity to combat—that is, on the territory of frontline states.

Therefore, nuclear potential with a tremendous striking force was accumulated on both sides of the line bisecting our continent into two military blocs. It consisted of tactical nuclear warheads designed to annihilate enemy troops in the regions of their offensive grouping and operational warheads for striking the rear of those troops.

The United States, the sole disposer of nuclear weapons within NATO, installed on the territory of West Germany bases of stationary and mobile launchers of nuclear-warhead-tipped missiles as well as at least six depots for those warheads. Similar storage facilities for U.S. nuclear warheads existed on the territory of Italy, Greece, and Turkey. The Americans also created, on the West German border, a protective belt on which nuclear mines were deployed; they were to be armed in the event of a direct threat of an outbreak of armed conflict.

The USSR certainly maintained a corresponding network of nuclear launchers and depots on GDR territory. The Western Group of Troops stationed there was viewed in the operational plans of the Warsaw Pact as the main first-strike force of land troops. Military nuclear installations existed on Polish territory and certainly also in Czechoslovakia and other Warsaw Pact countries.

On both sides, military planners continually updated the lists of targets on enemy territory for annihilation by nuclear weapons. Only on 13 September 1990, a year before the formal dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, did NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner declare, during a visit to Warsaw, that Poland was deleted from NATO's map of nuclear strike targets. In Brussels, it was certainly known by then that Moscow had withdrawn its nuclear potential from Poland.

Code Name "Vistula"

The construction of the complex of nuclear installations on the territory of Soviet military bases in Poland was begun in the second half of the 1960's. At the time, a new joint Polish-Soviet military commission was established to select the sites of those facilities and determine their design blueprints. It was then, too, that the General Staff of the Polish Army prepared a top secret map of the precise locations of those "special-purpose facilities."

That map, of which only one copy, kept in a wax-sealed envelope, existed, was deposited in the safe of the secret chancellery of the army's Operations Directorate. Anyone who consulted that map was required to sign his name on it, whereupon he resealed the envelope with wax and put it back in the safe. The envelope bore the code name "Vistula." In the past 20 years, the number of those signatures certainly did not exceed nine.

The Red Army high command never notified the Polish side about the nuclear warheads being stored in our country. Apart from Gen. Dubynin's declaration, there is no specific evidence that warheads or aerial bombs of that kind were concerned. They could just as well have

been neutron weapons or ordinary aerial bombs. Under the agreements in force, the Polish side was unable to monitor the freight transported by the Red Army in sealed railroad cars or military transport aircraft.

The number and striking power of the warheads on Polish territory remain unknown. However, Polish military experts have performed estimates that provide a rough picture of the nuclear volcano on whose crater we had been falling asleep every night for nearly 20 years.

Estimated Striking Power

The Soviets most likely stored chiefly nuclear warheads designed for tactical and operational-tactical missiles. The Northern Group of the Red Army included two operational-tactical missile brigades and two tactical-missile batteries. A missile brigade operated 12 launchers, and a battery three. Altogether, the Red Army in Poland could, upon the outbreak of military conflict, fire a salvo of 30 short- and medium-range missiles. It can thus be supposed that at least as many nuclear warheads must have been stored in the secret bunkers.

Presumably, however, there were many more of those warheads. It is likely that the Red Army also kept a stockpile of warheads that could be used, in the presence of a direct threat of outbreak of war, to arm the launchers operated by the Polish Army as well.

The Polish armed forces were equipped with launchers of operational-tactical missiles of the older generation—the R-170 and R-300 types. They were armed with conventional warheads, but they also could carry chemical and nuclear warheads over distances of 170 and 300 kilometers, respectively. There were four Polish brigades equipped with these missiles, with 12 launchers per brigade. In addition, each division included a battery of launchers of tactical missiles of both the older generation and the latest Tochka type; it can be assumed that their number totaled 45.

Altogether, therefore, the Soviet high command may have deployed in Poland 120 to 130 nuclear missiles, with the mean firepower of at least 20 kilotons of TNT each—that is, each with firepower equal to that of the bomb dropped by the Americans on Hiroshima. The Hiroshima bomb caused more than 78,000 casualties and destroyed 62,000 buildings, with the area of devastation measuring about 12 square kilometers.

A Hypothetical Question

Could it really be that, upon the outbreak of war, the Polish Army would have been provided with nuclear weapons by the USSR? That is a hypothetical question that cannot be answered.

The Warsaw Pact plans for combat cooperation in the event of armed conflict designated regions of direct contact between Polish missile brigades and Soviet units. That might be a premise for an affirmative answer. Exercises in operations seeming to point to such an intention of Moscow planners also were held.

Similar principles of cooperation in the event of war were binding in NATO. There, too, the troops of the U.S.'s allies held exercises in, for example, mounting nuclear warheads on the means of conveyance in their possession. Certainly therefore both superpowers made allowance for the missiles of their allies in calculations of nuclear striking power.

In the 1980's, the High Command of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact insistently pressed the Polish Ministry of National Defense to equip Polish operational-tactical missile brigades with Oka-type launchers of the newest generation, designed chiefly to carry nuclear warheads.

The General Staff of the Polish Army resolutely opposed those pressures, proceeding from the premise that the launchers are too costly. No one at the staff believed that the Soviets would provide the Polish Army with nuclear warheads, and no one intended to try to obtain them, either.

The then chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army, General of Arms Jozef Uzycki, in the late 1980's published an unusually interesting study presenting the inevitable globally catastrophic military, civilizational, and ecological consequences of local armed conflict in the European theater of war. That study, which is at present—unfairly and certainly solely for political reasons—being deliberately glossed over, represented the overt Polish polemics against the Soviet doctrine of "massed nuclear attack."

The General Staff did not support nuclear adventurism. Polish General Staff officers were aware that the acquisition of Oka-type launchers was to strengthen the Soviet nuclear fist in the event of war and that the expense of that strengthening was to burden the Polish budget. To relieve Soviet pressures, one experimental battery of Oka-type launchers was organized. No consent to anything else was given.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Egyptian Delegation Arrives in Washington for Disarmament Talks

NC1705162293 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1437 GMT
17 May 93

[Excerpt] Washington, 17 May (MENA)—Egypt will take part in the meetings of the Disarmament Committee emanating from the Middle East peace talks, which will open tomorrow, 18 May, in Washington. The committee will look into arms limitation and removal [of weapons of mass destruction] from the Middle East. An Egyptian delegation, led by Counselor Nabil Fahmi, arrived in Washington yesterday, to participate in the meetings.

It has been learned that the delegation will present a number of points during the talks concerning ways to curb the Middle East arms race and remove weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, biological, chemical—from the region. [passage, containing background material on the work of the committees involved in Middle East multilateral talks, omitted]

INDIA

Daily Discusses 'Ambiguity' of Nuclear Issue

BK1005151393 Delhi THE HINDUSTAN TIMES
in English 30 Apr 93 p 13

[By Bhabani Sen Gupta]

[Text] The Government is understood to have set up a top-level task force with the foreign secretary, and secretaries to the ministries of defence, finance, commerce, and science and technology, chaired by the cabinet secretary, to prepare for the coming talks with the United States Government on the nuclear issue.

The talks with a representative of the Canadian Government did not apparently go very well from either's point of view. The Indian side knew that the Canadian side was less than satisfied and the Canadian side left with the impression that the Indian side was far from pleased. Before that, a small delegation from Japan, came to New Delhi to discuss the nuclear issue. But the Japanese mostly listened to what Indians had to say without saying very much on their own except making it known that Tokyo would strongly wish India to join the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] family.

The Canadian team gave an inkling of what must be now a larger pool of Western thinking: it is that India will have access to the most modern technology if it signed the NPT. When one recalls that Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany has said before leaving India that being outside the NPT might deny India access to the best technology one cannot help having a testy feeling that

denial of the latest technology to those who would remain outside the NPT is being forged as a common Western strategy.

The Americans have been indulgent with India. When last year the foreign secretary went to Washington with the strategic concept of a "nuclear safe" South Asia, he found his American hosts in a listening mood. It is not such a bad idea, they told him (not exactly in these words), and we are quite interested, but you must tell us how you propose to translate your concept into reality. In other words, how do you propose to make South Asia nuclear safe?

The foreign secretary is believed to have asked for time to accomplish what undoubtedly would be a very creative job, and the Americans gave him time. In the meantime, they increased their pressure on Pakistan to make a dialogue with India possible with little or no success.

Early this year, a number of distinguished Americans who had signed a Carnegie Foundation booklet on Indo-American relations, urging the incoming Clinton administration to make India the fulcrum of its Asia policy, came to Delhi to attend a seminar with an equally distinguished group of Indians. The Carnegie team came up with a new strategic concept: nuclear restraint. It sounded sweet to Indian official ears though not to the ears of those who want India to cross the Rubicon and declare itself a nuclear power. I do not know if the "nuclear restraint" idea was discussed between Indian and U.S. officials. But it is not known that Americans were not hostile to the idea. Their position was quite simple: okay, we'll accept a South Asia bound by nuclear restraint but how does India propose to bring this about? What is the mechanism? How does India concretise the idea?

Early May, the United States will discuss the nuclear issue with three CIS republics—Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Each has a stockpile of strategic nuclear weapons on its territory. None of the three has signed the NPT. Nor indeed have those other CIS republics who have tactical nuclear weapons in their arsenals. Ukraine have taken up the position that it will sign the NPT only if its security from a nuclear attack is guaranteed by all the five nuclear powers. Belarus may adopt a similar position. Kazakhstan, which has closer ties with Russia than perhaps any other CIS republic, may well be satisfied with a Russian security guarantee. I had suggested in these columns some weeks before that India, Pakistan, and Israel be invited to the Washington conference. A single formula may not attract all the countries outside the NPT to sign the treaty. But a meeting in which all non-NPT countries air their views might produce several creative ideas to bring them all into the treaty.

Indians told the Canadian team that they hoped that the NPT would be modified before 1995, the final review year, that those who stayed outside because of its discriminatory nature might be willing to join it. No

thinking could be more wishful, however. The CIS republics which are outside the treaty, and Israel, India and Pakistan have no appetite to join together to demand the removal of the discriminatory clauses so that they could enter the large family of 155 nations.

In fact, none of these nations that are outside the NPT is much concerned about the discriminatory clauses which have kept India out. On the other hand, many of the countries that have signed the treaty have several problems with it, including the discriminatory clauses which can be used to deny technology to the developing nations. India can mobilise these nations and demand suitable revision of the treaty only if it is a member of the NPT family. As an outsider, it won't even be heard by the 1995 review conference which, in all likelihood, will extend the treaty indefinitely.

Whether India pursues the idea of a nuclear-safe South Asia, or the concept of nuclear restraint, it has to develop a new line of nuclear diplomacy. All these years it has remained perched on the immobile superior posture of proven capability to make the bomb and a firm determination not to make it. The posture changed in the 1980s when Americans found that Pakistan was about to make the bomb. India then shifted from yogilike position and declared that it would not make the bomb unless a Pakistani bomb compelled it to make one.

The irony of the situation is that Pakistan has officially told the U.S. it did make a number of bombs. Since India's official position is that it still has not made any bomb, the earlier assurance to the nation that it could not remain nonnuclear if Pakistan made the bomb was nothing more than a bluff. On numerous occasions, Indian official spokesman said on the floor of the Parliament and outside that the defence forces had been ordered to take "all appropriate measures" in response to the Pakistani bomb. Were all these assurances a bluff too?

India's we-do-not-have-the-bomb posture is contradicted by many of its official statements and has, therefore, lost international credibility. When a man like General K. Sundarji claims that there is an active "capability deterrent" breathing caution into the war-making minds in India and Pakistan, surely he does not mean that India has been sitting pretty with its 1974 proven capability while Pakistan went ahead to have half-a-dozen—or whatever the number—nuclear weapons that could be used in war.

The outside world, however polite it may be to India, has come to the end of its patience. India's new nuclear diplomacy can be either NPT-friendly or opposed to NPT. An NPT-friendly diplomacy may not require India to sign the treaty. But it will require India to negotiate with Pakistan and China a series of separate agreements. With Pakistan, a nuclear-safe South Asia will mean freezing both countries capabilities at the present stage, and a pledge not to use nuclear capability against one another. The freeze accord will have to be made open to

external verification. It will also mean that neither country will acquire more material for making bombs and take concerted measures for disposal of nuclear waste.

With China, India will have to negotiate an agreement which will make Tibet free of nuclear weapons and nuclear waste, and incorporate the Chinese unilateral verbal declarations that China will not make a first nuclear strike against a non-nuclear country. It is doubtful, in any case, if the second declaration applies to countries that are nuclear-capable.

If India determines to stay outside NPT, it must make that finally clear to the world and face the consequences with courage and grit. It may then proceed to make its own bombs, allowing Pakistan to make its own bombs too. That also will invite considerable international sanctions but India must have the courage to face them. The present ambiguity and ambivalence have run their course. The foreign secretary must not be compelled to face the Americans this month with the same basket of ambiguity that he has been trying to sell to various non-customers.

IRAN

Official on Iran's Security Policy

Denies Interest in Weapons of Mass Destruction

NC1405133393 Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English
5 May 93 pp 1, 15

[City Desk report on "exclusive" interview with Dr. Hamid Reza 'Asefi, Foreign Ministry director general for Western Europe Affairs—place and date not given]

[Excerpt] Tehran—A senior official of the Foreign Ministry said that the recent visit of the Iranian parliamentary delegation to Bonn has further solidified Irano-German relations.

Foreign Ministry Director General in Charge of West Europe Dr. Hamid Reza 'Asefi said that Germany and Iran have "had considerably good economic and commercial relations." [passage omitted]

Dr. 'Asefi was referring to last week's visit of the Iranian parliamentary delegation headed by Deputy Speaker of the Majles Hojjat ol-Eslam Hasan Ruhani. [passage omitted]

Dr. 'Asefi said that Iran is ready join hands with any country or countries or international agencies to eradicate so-called ABC or atomic, biological and chemical weapons plants from the region.

"We really want this region of the Middle East to be free of such deadly weapons," Dr. 'Asefi said and vowed that Iran is even ready to dismantle all plants which were

built for producing such weapons by the Shah's regime before the culmination of the Islamic Revolution in 1979.

"Yes, Iran is ready to clean this region from such enemies of human beings and also ready for the cooperation with other countries," Dr. 'Asefi officially announced.

Quoted by Russian Media

*PM1005120793 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 May 93 p 3*

["Own Information", ITAR-TASS report: "Iran Ready To Destroy Mass Destruction Weapons"]

[Text] Iran has expressed readiness to rid itself of plants manufacturing mass destruction weapons built under the shah.

Hamid Reza Asefi, general director of the Iranian Foreign Ministry for relations with Europe, said that Tehran wants to see the Near and Middle East region free from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. According to Asefi, Iran is ready to cooperate in attaining this aim with any state or states and also with international organizations. Western technical aid could ease the conversion of certain Iranian military plants, the diplomat stressed.

GENERAL

Recent Ukrainian Moves on Nuclear Issue

Rukh Chairman Interviewed by German Daily
AU0605100093 Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG
in German 3 May 93 p 8

[Interview with Vyacheslav Chornovil, chairman of the Ukrainian Rukh movement, by Manfred Quiring; place and date not given: "Will Ukraine Become a De Jure Nuclear State?"]

[Text] **Quiring:** How do you assess the prospects for the final ratification of the START I Treaty and the Non-proliferation Treaty by the Ukrainian Parliament?

Chornovil: I think that we will ratify START, and I am all for it. However, there are a number of conditions. First, we demand security guarantees from Russia. Even though we have convinced ourselves that we do not have any potential enemies, when Russia's Vice President Rutskoy and the Parliament make territorial claims on Ukraine, there must be something.

Therefore, we expect guarantees and material compensation. Compensation only means securing disassembly, which is very expensive. We are expected to transport all the warheads to Russia and that is it. But what does one do with the missiles with liquid fuel, with the launch chutes, and the people who operate all that? They, too, must receive social safeguards if they are to be unemployed in the future. Ecological problems also play a serious role. Only when all this is clarified may START I be ratified.

However, this does not exhaust Ukraine's nuclear potential. There remain 46 missiles, and I am absolutely against transferring them to Russia. One need not be hypocritical. We are a de facto nuclear state, we must declare ourselves as such as a matter of law. This would be a clear gesture that we are the first nuclear state to express its intention to free itself from nuclear weapons.

Quiring: Actually, Ukraine itself cannot really dispose of its nuclear missiles.

Chornovil: This is claimed, but it is wrong. First, they are on our territory. Second, we have certain administrative control. In a decree Colonel General Konstantin Morosov, the Ukrainian defense minister, obliged the 43d Missile Army, which is stationed in Ukraine, to swear an oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people. Therefore, this army is subject to Ukrainian control to a certain extent. In addition, there are technical possibilities to prevent a sudden missile launch.

Quiring: How were your views received during your visits to the United States and Great Britain?

Chornovil: The main thing for the United States is that there are no missiles aimed at its territory. Unfortunately, in the United States there is something that I would call democratic imperialism.

It considers Ukraine still to be a zone of Russia's strategic interests. We are expected simply to raise our hands. Both the United States and Russia want that.

I have asked for more consideration to be shown toward those states that are located in the "buffer zone" between Russia and the Western world.

Quiring: What could the United States do to support Ukraine in overcoming its economic crisis and what can it not do?

Chornovil: It cannot implement the reforms for us or work for us. We ourselves must forge our happiness. Nevertheless, we must think about aid in the form of loans. We must compensate for the deteriorating living conditions. If we had been given loans for the purchase of the necessary foodstuffs and pharmaceuticals, we would have had fewer political difficulties. Today dissatisfaction is very strong, and the people link the current scarcity of goods with the fact that we have become an independent state.

Loans, investment, economic cooperation—these are the important factors. The United States is implementing them to a minimum degree. Washington can support the democratic forces quietly via various funds but certainly not by direct pressure.

Quiring: How important are Ukrainian-Russian relations for you? How can they be normalized?

Chornovil: We need normal relations with Russia. One need not have come up with the CIS, since normal bilateral relations with Russia would have been sufficient. Then the current blackmails and economic traps would not exist. I am worried by the constant statements by Prime Minister Kuchma about the resumption of relations with Russia, from which we depend on 60 percent. Unfortunately, the government is not making any attempt to break out of this dependence or to reorient Ukraine's economy.

In addition, Ukraine must look for contacts with Russian democratic forces. We have gradually lost them all.

Decision To Abide by 1980 Nuclear Materials Convention

LD0505201893 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1800 GMT 5 May 93

[Text] The 1980 convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials is to be considered obligatory for Ukraine, as one of the legal successor states of the former Soviet Union.

This was the decision adopted by the Supreme Council session at its evening plenary session. It had been proposed by the Ukrainian president. During the discussion, it was stressed that this convention regulated the efforts of almost 100 states in counteracting criminal actions that encroach upon the rights of and can result in considerable damage to people, their property, and the environment.

Ukraine's participation in the convention and the fulfillment of its requirements will raise radiation safety levels at Ukraine's nuclear facilities and will promote intensive measures to ensure the safekeeping of nuclear material.

The session also adopted the draft law on Ukraine's international agreements at its first reading.

Parliamentarian Confers With British Envoy

*Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian
1900 GMT 5 May 93*

Ukraine Supreme Council Chairman Ivan Plyushch received Simon Hemans, British ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Ukraine, at the latter's request on 5 May.

A business-like conversation was held, in the course of which the ambassador was introduced to processes currently under way in Ukraine. The issue relating to problems of disarmament and, in particular, elimination of nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory was raised at the ambassador's request.

Plyushch explained that Ukraine firmly abides by its policy outlined, which is to become a non-nuclear state. It also intends to reduce its armed forces to a considerable extent. However, our state was relying on the West adopting an understanding attitude towards Ukraine's need for collective security guarantees, the head of parliament said.

During the conversation, considerable attention was paid to interparliamentary links. It was stressed that they were of significant importance to the successful development of democratic processes.

Politician Promotes New Plan for Nonnuclear Status

*MK0605094093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 6 May 93 p 1*

[Vladimir Skachko report under the rubric "Disarmament": "Wait Till Talbott Comes... Nonnuclear Ukraine: New Trends"]

[Excerpts] Strobe Talbott, U.S. State Department ambassador at large and adviser on relationships with the newly independent states, arrives in Kiev on 14 May. In Ukraine, they link his visit to a possible change in the U.S. stance in regard to the nuclear weapons deployed in the republic, and also in regard to Ukraine itself. In the opinion of Ukrainian politicians, while earlier the

United States demanded that Ukraine unconditionally carry out its pledges on the ratification of the START I treaty, the Lisbon Protocol, and the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, while providing for this purpose only \$175 million without security guarantees, now, after the obstinacy and firmness of the Ukrainian position has become apparent, the United States is ready to come to an agreement and proposes more acceptable options, compensation, and guarantees of security. [passage omitted]

HOLOS UKRAINY quoted U.S. President Bill Clinton as saying that in line with the START I treaty, the United States will "do everything to speed up the dismantling by Russia and the three other states of the nuclear weapons on their territory." On the basis of this statement, the newspaper concludes that without renouncing nuclear disarmament, the United States will renounce the tactics of pressure on Ukraine and sit down together with it at the negotiating table. Attention is being drawn to the fact that Strobe Talbott is making his first stopover in the CIS precisely in Kiev.

At the same time, Pavel Zhovnirenko, member of the Parliamentary Commission on International Affairs, an advocate of nonnuclear status for Ukraine, proposed a compromise solution to the problem of Ukrainian security. In his opinion, Ukraine can come forward with an initiative for signing a multilateral agreement between Ukraine, on the one hand, and the United States and Russia, and, possibly, with Britain and France, on the other. This agreement, according to Zhovnirenko, would resemble the agreement on the restoration of an independent democratic Austria that was signed in 1955 between Britain, France, the United States, and the USSR, on one hand, and Austria on the other. Under this agreement, the nuclear states pledged to respect the independence, territorial integrity, and inviolability of Austria's borders; they guaranteed the impermissibility of its being annexed to the FRG, while Austria pledged to follow democratic principles and observe neutrality. Pavel Zhovnirenko proposed to add to that one more thing—nonnuclear status for Ukraine. In his opinion, this would make it possible for Ukraine not to fear an attack from Russia; the West would then try to secure destruction of part of the ex-USSR's nuclear potential, while Russia would remain the sole nuclear power in East Europe. Pavel Zhovnirenko showed to your NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent a reply to his proposal from Zbigniew Brzezinski. The American political scientist replied that he was staggered by the idea, and that it merited further elaboration.

Ukraine Hosts U.S. Ambassador Talbott

Arrives for Talks on Nuclear Disarmament

*LD0905213893 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 2100 GMT 9 May 93*

[Text] A special envoy of the American secretary of state, Strobe Talbott, has arrived in the capital of Ukraine,

Kiev, for talks about nuclear disarmament of this former Soviet republic. In an interview to local correspondents he expressed concern that Ukraine has not yet ratified the START I Treaty but demands as a precondition safety guarantees from the nuclear powers and wishes to get some three billion dollars as compensation for its disarmament.

UNIAR Reports

WS1205084493 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1422 GMT
10 May 93 (Tentative)

[All names and titles as received]

[Text] Kiev, 10 May—The 2-day visit in Ukraine by a U.S. delegation headed by U.S. Ambassador-at-Large Strobe Talbott was concluded with press conference held at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry press center. The U.S. delegation included Ms. Tobi Haiti, managing director of the National Security Council; Admiral William Studeman, CIA deputy director; Brigadier General James Rylie; Graham Ellison, U.S. Assistant Defense Secretary; and others. The composition of the delegation points to its significance. Some observers, however, noted that none of the Ukrainian officials met the delegation on the day of its arrival.

At the press conference, Strobe Talbott said he had a 40-minute conversation with the Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk. Mr. Talbott delivered a letter from the U.S. President Bill Clinton which says the United States is intent on expanding bilateral relations with Ukraine. An agreement was reached with President Kravchuk to create a U.S.-Ukrainian charter that will determine relations between Ukraine and the United States.

The delegation members met with Ukrainian Defense Minister Morozov, Vice Prime Minister Pynzenyuk, Supreme Council Deputy Chairman Durdynets, and Foreign Minister Zlenko.

"The visit shows that Ukraine and the U.S. have turned over a new page in their mutual relations," summarized U.S. Ambassador-at-Large Strobe Talbott.

While answering question, the ambassador declared that a preliminary agreement had been reached on a number of issues. Ukraine has accepted the idea of establishing a committee on military issues and a military conversion group.

Borys Tarasyuk, Ukrainian deputy foreign minister, said that since the two sides agreed that their present mutual relations were unsatisfactory, some steps were considered that could alter the situation.

Concluding the press conference, Strobe Talbott noted that he had received confirmation that Ukraine will fulfill its international commitments as regards the non-nuclear status. He emphasized, however, that this is not the only field of our cooperation.

Russian Paper Offers View

MK1205123493 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 12 May 93 p 3

[Vladimir Skachko article published in the "Ukraine" column: "On Nuclear Weapons in a Broader Context. U.S. Ambassador at Large Visits Kiev"]

[Text] The result of a 2-day visit to Kiev by an official U.S. delegation led by Strobe Talbott, ambassador at large, special adviser to the U.S. secretary of state for contacts with the newly independent states, according to his statement at a press conference concluding his visit is a "more clear-cut perception of the Ukrainian point of view." As Talbott said, during the meetings in Kiev the main attention was devoted to Ukrainian-U.S. cooperation in all spheres, including nuclear disarmament. Among the concrete results achieved during the meetings and talks with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, first deputy parliament speaker Vasiliy Durdynets, Vice Premier Viktor Pinzenik, Defense Minister Konstantin Moroz, and Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko, Strobe Talbott noted preliminary accords on creating bilateral Ukrainian-U.S. groups to work on military questions and the implementation of conversion projects in Ukraine. In addition, in Kiev the U.S. side offered its assistance in privatization and expressed its readiness to act as mediator in normalizing Ukrainian-Russian relations provided Moscow and Kiev agree. Support was expressed for the idea to prepare by this June a Ukrainian-U.S. charter as a basis for further deepening of comprehensive Ukrainian-U.S. relations. Ukrainian Defense Minister Konstantin Moroz was invited to come to the United States on an official visit.

Boris Tarasyuk, Ukrainian deputy foreign minister and chairman of the Ukrainian National Disarmament Committee, stated at the press conference that although it was noted at the talks that Ukrainian-U.S. relations had deteriorated in recent months, the sides agreed that this situation should be remedied. According to many politicians in Kiev, however, little was done at the negotiations to fundamentally improve Ukrainian-U.S. relations, while the visit was a preliminary, fact-finding mission. Neither was any progress made on the deadlocked question about Ukraine's nuclear disarmament and its ratification of the START I Treaty. Prior to his visit, in an exclusive interview with the parliamentary newspaper GOLOS UKRAINY Strobe Talbott said: "We will be seeking to talk about the nuclear weapons still located in Ukraine in a broader context that would take into account Ukraine's legitimate concerns about the guarantees for its security. Therefore we will discuss with the Ukrainian leaders the actual long-term interests of your state in respect to security. We would also like to discuss in what way the United States could help it ensure these interests." At the same time, in the same interview Talbott stated: "Of course, while establishing truly partner-type relations with any country, one must

be sure that one's partner fulfills international obligations. And we will also discuss this in Ukraine when the question of ratification comes up."

Presumably all this was actually discussed in the course of a private talk between Strobe Talbott and Leonid Kravchuk, which the U.S. guest described as the visit's culmination and during which he gave Kravchuk a personal letter from U.S. President Bill Clinton. Strobe Talbott said that he had received from Leonid Kravchuk an assurance of Ukraine's undeviating course toward acquiring a nonnuclear status. And still many in Kiev have assessed the results of this meeting as nil. Kiev politicians still see some hope for a change in the U.S. attitude to Ukraine in that the United States will want Ukraine to be a military and political counterbalance to Russia and a guarantee of stability in the East Europe region. Talbott's words suggest that these hopes are not groundless: "Above all we are thinking about your security and the security of the entire region—after all, stability in East Europe to a large extent depends on Ukraine."

New U.S. Tactic Seen

*PM1205153793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
13 May 93 First Edition p 3*

[Aleksandr Sychev report: "United States Changes Tactic To Persuade Ukraine To Renounce Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] During the Senate hearings on the question of ratification of the Russian-U.S. Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher voiced the hope that Ukraine will very soon ratify the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the START I Treaty.

A breakthrough was made during the recent visit to Kiev of Strobe Talbott, U.S. ambassador for relations with the countries which have emerged in place of the former Soviet Union. This high-ranking U.S. representative was, to all appearances, to have resolved at least two tasks: to persuade Kiev to fulfill its promise to become a nuclear-free state and to ease tension in U.S.-Ukrainian relations.

Until recently Washington's position on the problem of nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory had been noted for its toughness. Matters reached the point where, during Ukrainian Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma's recent U.S. visit, President William Clinton refused to meet with him, thereby expressing Washington's displeasure at the delay over settling the problem of the Soviet nuclear legacy. In response Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk originally refused to receive Talbott, claiming to be too busy. True, the meeting did take place in the end.

Washington's political pressure on Kiev produced the opposite effect—the positions of supporters of preserving the republic's nuclear status were strengthened in

the Ukrainian parliament, and last month they almost succeeded in adopting a decision to renounce the previously adopted pledges.

It was all this that evidently caused Washington to change its tactic. In Kiev Talbott endeavored to convince the republic's leadership that on the question of nuclear weapons the United States is not operating in Moscow's interests. At the end of the visit he also declared that Washington now has a better understanding of Ukraine's position, although, to all appearances, there have been no changes in it. Kiev still voices concern at the threat to its independence from Russia, insists on special guarantees of its nuclear security, and demands compensation for disarmament to the tune of \$2.8 billion.

Talbott gave partial replies to the Ukrainian terms. He promised to use the good relations which the United States has established with Russia and Ukraine to assist in settling problems between Moscow and Kiev. In addition, in the event of the Ukrainian parliament's ratification of the two treaties, relations between Washington and Kiev will be "considerably improved."

These promises enabled Talbott to smooth the sharp corners in U.S.-Ukrainian relations and once again to secure the Ukrainian leadership's assurance of its adherence to the idea of the republic's nuclear-free status. It is hard to judge at present the extent to which Talbott's visit has changed the sentiments in the Ukrainian parliament. U.S. Secretary of State Christopher obviously took this ongoing factor of uncertainty into account when he tried to convince the senators that in any case they have "no reason not to approve the START II Treaty."

Russian Daily on Talbott's Nuclear Arms Mediation Offer

*MK1205120693 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 12 May 93 p 10*

[Veniamin Zasulskiy, Natalya Kalashnikova report: "Nuclear Arms Talks. The U.S. Offers Mediation to Russia, Ukraine"]

[Text] Strobe Talbott, ambassador at large and adviser for CIS issues, made a proposal yesterday in Kiev that came as a surprise to many observers, offering U.S. mediation in the Russian-Ukrainian dispute over nuclear arms. Thus the Clinton administration has once again demonstrated its interest in seeing Russian-Ukrainian nuclear contradictions resolved because in the U.S. view, they have reached too serious a point.

Speaking at a press conference after his meeting with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, Talbott said that he had, by and large, "figured out the reasons" for Ukraine's delaying the ratification of the START I Treaty. As the adviser sees it, Kiev is in no hurry to part with nuclear arms for fear, in the first place, of a Russian military threat. This is why the Ukrainians continue to

insist that security guarantees be given. Moscow, for its part, is trying to persuade both Kiev and Washington that all conceivable guarantees have already been given to Ukraine. Moreover, wishing to dispel Ukraine's suspicions that the nuclear arms that are being withdrawn from its territory may be used against it, Russia suggested that Kiev use the "nuclear stuffing" from the arms dismantled in Ukraine as fuel for its nuclear power stations. This may be interpreted as a step toward meeting Ukraine's demands that its right of ownership of the nuclear arms components located on its territory be recognized. As a specific disarmament step, it has been proposed that delivery vehicles step down from their flight assignments. This and a number of other proposals by Moscow have so far been left unanswered, which plainly shows that the bilateral talks are in crisis.

Kiev continues the bargaining over financial costs, too. Nuclear disarmament is an expensive undertaking that will cost the republic \$2.8 billion, according to Ukrainian experts' estimates. The United States has promised to lend a helping hand to Kiev (judging from its own estimates, it put the amount of aid at \$175 million), but only after START I is ratified.

The nuclear disputes of the two former USSR republics, which at first glance seem to be quite amenable to solution, are turning into a serious security threat to the outside world. Unless START I is ratified, START II cannot come into force (and, remember, it has many opponents in the Russian parliament), which would create significant difficulties in relations between Russia and the United States. At the U.S. Defense Department, where they no longer count on an early ratification of the treaty, talk has begun on the need "to keep their powder dry" and to resume nuclear testing in the very near future.

Ukraine's unwillingness to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (which it intended to do as a nonnuclear state) is also a matter of concern for the world community. North Korea has already withdrawn from the treaty, and the emergence of yet another nuclear state, Ukraine, may add to the problem. Finally, even if Kiev's current stance is prompted only by its desire to get certain political and economic dividends, the lack of proper control over nuclear arms is a headache for the IAEA.

In the current situation, Washington has moved to take over the burden of responsibility. There are also doubts, however, as to the prospective success of this mission: Kiev deems the U.S. stance to be clearly pro-Russian. This opinion of Ukraine grew even stronger after U.S. President Bill Clinton refused to meet with Ukraine Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma. The reason given for that was just the same: procrastination on the ratification of START I.

Transcript of Reagan-Gorbachev Summit in Reykjavik

93WC0065A Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 4, Apr 93 [Signed to press 19 Feb 93] pp 79-86

[Materials from Gorbachev archives: "Conversations of M. S. Gorbachev with R. Reagan in Reykjavik on 11-12 October 1986"]

[Text] On 3 January 1993, the SOA-2 [Strategic Offensive Arms-2] Treaty was signed in Moscow, according to which the United States of America and Russia would reduce their arsenals of strategic offensive arms by two-thirds no later than the year 2003. A great step would thereby be made on the road to nuclear disarmament.

It is appropriate to recall that the beginning of the process of reducing nuclear weapons was laid down by the INF Treaty of 1987 and the SOA-1 Treaty signed in 1991 (but which has not yet gone into effect). The signing of these treaties was preceded by a meeting of the leaders of the two nuclear super-powers—M. S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan—in Reykjavik in October of 1986.

Held at the initiative of M. S. Gorbachev, the Reykjavik meeting bore a dramatic character. The possibility of radical reductions and elimination of nuclear weapons was discussed for the first time. Moreover, the parties came close to agreement, but were not able to reach final agreement. The stumbling block became the American SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] program. Nevertheless, it was specifically this meeting which essentially laid the foundation for the breakthrough in reduction of nuclear weapons.

The editors are beginning the publication of the transcript of the talks in Reykjavik, which have been kindly presented to us by the "Gorbachev Fund."

The First Talk

(Initially one-on-one) - morning of 11 October 1986

After exchanging greetings, R. Reagan and M. Gorbachev agree on the order of conducting the meeting.

Reagan: I have been impatiently awaiting this meeting. In the organizational plan, it would evidently be expedient to devote part of the time to talks held one-on-one, and part of the time—to the exchange of opinions in the presence of the ministers of foreign affairs. Is this procedure acceptable to you?

Gorbachev: Yes, I agree with this. As a matter of fact, that is what we had in mind when we proposed the meeting.

Reagan: With what problems shall we begin our discussion? It seems to me that we have an entire series of problems which were left without adequate discussion at our meeting in Geneva, as well as questions which have arisen since that time. I am referring to the problem of intermediate range weapons, space, and agreements on

ABM [anti-ballistic missile] defense, as well as proposals on strategic weapons which were discussed by our delegations at the talks in Geneva. I am proceeding from the fact that both our sides have expressed the desire to rid the world of ballistic missiles and of nuclear missiles in general. The world is impatiently awaiting an answer from us on the question of whether it is possible to realize this desire.

Gorbachev: Mr. President, I believe that it would make sense to first conduct a brief exchange of opinions on the situation in the world which has prompted us to appeal to you with the proposal of an urgent meeting, and then I would like to present to you the specific ideas with which we have come to this meeting. I believe that it would be beneficial to invite E. A. Shevardnadze and G. Shultz to that part of our discussion when I will present the specific proposals. Obviously, we will be ready to discuss all questions which the American side feels necessary to raise.

What you have said in regard to the topics of the discussion coincides with our feelings about what questions are expedient to discuss at a personal meeting of the leaders. I can assure you that we have much to say on the problematics of arms limitation and disarmament. At our subsequent meetings, as I understood from the speech you gave prior to your departure for Reykjavik, we will also touch upon other questions—regional, humanitarian, and bilateral, which are the subject of concern for both your country and ours.

Reagan: I would like to add that, in my opinion, we really will have to talk about human rights. Unlike other questions which we have cited, this problem will not be the subject of official agreements between us. However, it has a great influence on how far we can go in cooperation with the Soviet Union in view of our public opinion. I already told you in Geneva, and I will repeat now, that human rights, and specifically questions of exit from the Soviet Union, are ever present in appeals to me. And if we are unable to resolve these problems in a satisfactory manner, then this will also affect other questions in the sense that the community will not give the American government credit for implementing possible agreements, if we do not convince the Soviet side to agree to an easing of its position on human rights.

Gorbachev: We will still talk about human rights. But now I would like to express in principle form our general impression of what has happened in the world since the meeting in Geneva, what problems are the subject of concern of the Soviet Union and the US. It is useful to compare our evaluations on this matter, and then to go on to specific problems of arms control and disarmament, including strategic arms, medium-range missiles, the ABM Treaty and the cessation of nuclear testing. On these questions I will speak out specifically, as we had agreed, in the presence of E. A. Shevardnadze and G. Shultz.

Reagan: Yes, I agree with your approach. I raised the topic of human rights only to remind you of those explanations which I gave on this topic in Geneva. We do not want to intervene in the domestic functions of your government. However, we believe it is important that you know the force of public opinion in the US. We are a nation of immigrants. One out of every eight Americans has some relation with your country and your people. Just yesterday I received a letter from one of the senators, whose mother is Russian. I understand the force of the national spiritual tie, since I, as an Irishman, feel these ties myself, in this case with Ireland. Therefore, I see that all Americans are concerned about what is going on in that country which is bound to them with these ties. And it will be easier for us to conclude agreements on various questions under conditions when our public opinion is not aroused and is not angered by some events in the country of their cultural heritage. However, I agree that these problems become secondary in importance as compared with the problems of nuclear arms. They have worldwide significance, and the entire world awaits their decision from us.

Gorbachev: Mr. President, in the spirit of our coordinated approach to the question of how to organize our meeting, I would like to make you aware of the evaluations given by the Soviet leadership, and by me personally, of the importance of the meeting in Reykjavik in connection with the situation in the world and the status of Soviet-American relations. Much is being said these days throughout the world about our meeting, and the most varied, even opposing, judgements are being expressed. But now, when we are sitting at this table and our meeting has begun, I am even more firmly convinced of the fact that the decision to hold it was a responsible step by both sides. First of all, our direct discussion signifies that Soviet-American dialogue continues. Although it is proceeding with difficulty, not as our peoples and the entire world would like, nevertheless it is continuing. And this in itself already justifies the trip to Reykjavik. Some people—and there are quite a few of them—believe that the Reykjavik meetings are associated with certain personal ambitions of the participants. I am in categorical disagreement with this and refute it. The meeting is a testimony to our responsibility to the respective peoples of our countries and the entire world. After all, much in the world really does depend on our two countries, and on the quality of relations between them and their leaders.

Reagan: I have already told you that I believe our situation to be unique. Here we are, the two of us, sitting together in a room, and we may resolve the question of whether there will be peace or war in the world. We both want peace, but how to achieve it, how to strengthen trust and reduce mutual suspicion between our two peoples!

Gorbachev: That was my second thought, and I would like to develop it, supporting in principle what you have said. After Geneva, we put a complex and expansive mechanism of Soviet-American dialogue into motion. In

this time, the mechanism of our dialogue has been disrupted several times, it has suffered many bumps and bruises, but on the whole it is moving ahead, and the movement is taking on force. This is a positive result. However, on the main questions which concern both sides—how to eliminate the nuclear threat, how to utilize the beneficial impulse of Geneva, how to reach specific agreements—there is no movement, and this concerns us somewhat. Many words have been said regarding these problems. They have been discussed in detail and are being discussed at the negotiations on YaKV [editor's note: reference is made here to the Soviet-American talks in Geneva on nuclear-space arms]. However, these talks have practically come to a standstill. How can we give a different evaluation when at these talks there are 50-100 variants swimming around in the air, and we cannot see one or two which would really ensure the progress of the negotiations? Therefore, we have come to the conclusion that we need an urgent meeting with you, so as to give a strong impulse to this process and allow us to reach agreements which could be concluded during our next meeting in the USA.

Reagan: I think exactly the same. As has been explained to me, there is an entire series of proposals on the negotiating table in Geneva. There was a proposal to limit nuclear missiles by 50 percent, to a limit of 4,500 warheads. For you this turned out to be too low a threshold, and you proposed parameters of 6,400-6,800 warheads. For us this figure was too high, since it allows a threat of destruction to the entire world. We proposed an intermediate solution, a middle figure between these two indicators, i.e., 5,500 nuclear weapons, keeping in mind the fact that our goal remains the total elimination of strategic nuclear missiles.

Gorbachev: I would like to make clear to you and to the U.S. government the thought that we want such solutions to the problem of arms limitation and are approaching our proposals which I will present today in such a way that the reduction in nuclear arms would consider to an equal degree the interests of both the US and the Soviet Union. If in our proposals we considered only our own interests, and thereby gave reason to suspect that we were seeking roundabout means of attaining military supremacy, this would not stimulate the American side to seek agreement, and could not be the basis of agreement. Therefore, I would like to precisely, firmly and clearly announce that we are in favor of such a solution to the problem which would ultimately provide for complete liquidation of nuclear weapons and would ensure equality and equal security of the USA and the Soviet Union at all stages of movement toward this goal. Any other approach would be unintelligible, unrealistic, and inadmissible. We would hope that the USA would act in the same way.

Reagan: We have exactly the same feelings. A difficult question here is verification and control over the fulfillment of the assumed responsibilities for arms reduction. There is a Russian proverb to this effect: Trust, but

verify. At our previous talks, we expressed optimism regarding the reduction of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. I am referring to the total elimination of this class of weapons. The participants in the negotiations cite a number of other questions where progress is possible, specifically strategic arms. Yet in all these questions we need verification and control over fulfillment of the agreed-upon responsibilities. If we are able to achieve this, then the entire world will welcome such an outcome.

Gorbachev: I will not object here. We have a clear position in favor of effective control over fulfillment of disarmament agreements. Today, when we have supposedly come to that stage when the process of developing specific agreements may begin, it is rather important for us to ensure effective and reliable control within the framework of such agreement. If we do not have this, then I do not think that we will be able to ensure tranquility and a peaceful situation for our peoples. We are ready to go together with you as far in questions of control as our confidence in fulfillment of responsibilities under the agreements will permit. I am prepared to speak out more specifically later, when we invite our ministers. But now I would like to say a few words about the future meeting in the US. We view Reykjavik as a step along the path to this meeting.

Reagan: Our meeting has been called a "base camp" on the way to Washington.

Gorbachev: Yes, and they added that it was located halfway. After all, Reykjavik is located almost exactly halfway between Moscow and Washington.

Reagan: When I agreed to your proposal regarding the meeting, I did not measure the geographical distance. It just seemed to me that London was not quite a suitable place for a meeting of the format and character which you proposed. It is too large a city, with too many distractions, but here we can discuss everything calmly. By the way, can we talk about the date of your visit to Washington? Are you going to give your suggestions, or should I name a date?

Gorbachev: I will complete my thought. I have already spoken publicly and indicated in correspondence with you that both our countries must be interested in the effectiveness of my visit to the US. We agree that this meeting must lead to tangible achievements on cardinal important problems of limiting the arms race which worry the Americans, the Soviet people, and other peoples. You and I cannot allow the upcoming meeting to fail in this sense. It would be a very serious blow. People would begin to ask what kind of politicians these are who meet with each other, pronounce many words, talk for hours, hold one, two, three meetings, and still cannot agree on anything. This would be a scandalous outcome, with consequences which would be difficult to predict. It would evoke disappointment throughout the entire world. The meeting in Reykjavik, we are convinced, must create the prerequisites for the fact that

during my visit to the US we will be able to work out and sign agreements on problems of arms limitation. This would give it a significant result. But for this we must compare our points of view on these problems today and tomorrow, outline the means of their resolution, coordinate the assignments given to our ministers of foreign affairs and other representatives, and define the volume of work, and already with consideration of all this determine when it would be most expedient to conduct my visit to the US.

Reagan: One other problem which I have not mentioned. If we come to an agreement regarding the number of strategic missiles, then we will have to agree at the same time on their maximal throw-weight. After all, it would hardly make sense to establish some limit on the number of missiles and open the possibility for the parties to have only heavy missiles within the framework of this limit. This would not reduce the destructive force of nuclear missiles, and we do not agree to this. We must, within the framework of an intermediate decision, agree also on the throw-weight, obviously keeping in mind the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Gorbachev: I will answer that question for you. But now, if you do not object, we will invite Mr. Schultz and E. A. Shevardnadze.

The discussion was further continued in the presence of the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Secretary of State.

Reagan briefly informs his both ministers about the content of the discussion which had been held, and gives the floor to M. S. Gorbachev.

Gorbachev: I will begin the presentation of our proposals.

Our parties are in agreement that the principle question of international policy of the two countries is the recognition of complete elimination of nuclear weapons as our mutual goal. This is logically tied with our agreement in Geneva regarding the fact that nuclear war is inadmissible and impossible.

How do we understand the movement toward this goal? Our approach was presented in my announcement of 15 January 1986. Your side also made corresponding official announcements. I would like to confirm our point of view regarding the fact that we should move toward this goal in stages, ensuring at each stage equal security for both sides. We expect that the US will act in the same manner. Such an approach is once again organically tied with our agreement in Geneva regarding the fact that not one of the parties should strive to achieve military supremacy over the other.

I will present our proposals on **strategic offensive arms**. Both we and the US have presented proposals on a 50 percent reduction of SOA. We spoke of this also at the meeting in Geneva. However, since that time, many variants have passed across the negotiation table. I would like to confirm now that the Soviet leadership is

interested specifically in deep, 50 percent, reductions in SOA—and no less. The year which has elapsed since Geneva has convinced us of the fact that the world awaits from the USSR and the US not merely insignificant, but specifically deep reductions in SOA. We are proposing now, as opposed to our previous proposal of a 50 percent reduction in arms which can reach each other's territory, to agree on the reduction only of SOA. We are leaving aside intermediate range missiles and U.S. forward basing means. Here we consider the point of view of the US, and are making a great concession to it. Since strategic arms comprise the basis of the nuclear arsenals of both sides, we believe that their reduction must be performed with the constant retention of equality or parity. We are proceeding from the fact that both the USSR and the USA will agree with the fact that the reductions must consider the historically formulated peculiarities in the structure of the nuclear forces of each of the parties.

With 50 percent reductions, we are ready to take into account the concerns of the US regarding heavy missiles and also intend to significantly reduce our weapons of this type. I emphasize—significantly, and not cosmetically. However, we also expect that the US will also show similar attention toward the concerns of the USSR. I will illustrate this with the following example. The US has 6,500 nuclear warheads on submarines deployed throughout the world, which present a great problem in terms of verification and control. Of these, 800 are warheads with MRV (multiple reentry vehicles). We also know the accuracy of the American missiles, both ground- and submarine-based. We hope that the US will meet the Soviet Union halfway on this point.

Medium-range missiles [IRBM]. We have spoken much about them, much is being said about them throughout the world, and various predictions are being made. The Soviet leadership has once again analyzed this problem from all sides. We have considered the situation in Western Europe, the opinion of the governments and the community of these countries, and decided that we must approach this problem from the broadest positions, naturally considering both our interests, the interests of our allies, and the interests of the US. Based on this, we propose the complete elimination of USSR and USA missiles of this class in Europe. We are agreeing to a great concession—withdrawing the question of the nuclear forces of England and France. I think you understand what a great new step we are now taking: After all, the nuclear potentials of these countries continue to grow quantitatively and qualitatively. Yet we are ready to seek a compromise solution and are even agreeing to considerable risk for this sake. We would hope that the US, acting in the spirit of compromise, would also agree to make some concessions to us, and considering the major concession which we have made, would withdraw the question of the Soviet medium-range missiles in Asia, or would at least agree to begin talks on nuclear arms—Soviet and American—in Asia.

Within the framework of this problem, we are ready to resolve the question also of missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km. We are ready to freeze their numbers and to begin negotiations on these missiles.

This is how our proposals on nuclear arms appear. We would hope that the American leadership will duly evaluate our broad compromise approach.

The third question consists of the **problems of ABM defense and banning of nuclear testing**. I believe that for us the assurance of preserving a timeless ABM Treaty, the clearly designated term for non-exercizing the right of withdrawal from the treaty, would have the goal of strengthening the conditions of the ABM Treaty as a foundation on which we could resolve the problems of nuclear disarmament as a whole. Here we propose coming to an agreement on a compromise basis. We are adopting the American approach, which provides for the basic term of non-exercizing the right of withdrawal from the treaty and the term of conducting negotiations, and are proposing to define the joint term of full and strict adherence to all points of the ABM Treaty. Here it is important to ensure mutual understanding of the fact that developments and testing in the sphere of SDI would be allowed within the confines of laboratories, with prohibition of outside-of-laboratory testing of means intended for space-based destruction of objects in space and on Earth. Obviously, this would not entail a prohibition on testing permitted under the ABM Treaty, i.e., testing of stationery ground-based systems and their components.

In regard to the term of non-exercising the right to withdraw from the treaty, different figures were quoted by both sides. We are proposing as a compromise variant a rather long time—10 years and no less, and then we would have, say, 3-5 years to decide what to do further on this problem.

One other aspect. Logically stemming from the need for preserving the ABM Treaty which has been acknowledged by both sides is also the need to prohibit anti-satellite means. After all, it is clear to you and to us that if this were not done, then in the course of creating anti-satellite means it would be possible also to develop anti-missile weapons. Therefore, it is prudent to reach mutually acceptable agreements on the prohibition of anti-satellite means and to cut off this channel.

On the problem of nuclear testing. We have pondered this question at length and from all sides. Perhaps in some degree it is understandable that until the parties agree to broad measures for reducing the strategic potential, their nuclear weapons, one of the sides might still have doubts as to the expediency of total cessation of nuclear testing. However, today in the context of the proposals which I have presented, such doubts must be cast aside. Therefore, it is expedient to agree on the full and final prohibition of nuclear testing. As we know, we have had negotiations on this question. We propose to

renew them on a bilateral or trilateral (with the participation of Great Britain) basis. Obviously, as long as the negotiations are going on, the parties may act at their discretion. But in the course of the negotiations, as we understand, questions of control, of reducing the energy yield thresholds of the blasts, of reducing their number, and of the agreements of 1974 and 1976 could be reviewed. The start of negotiations on the total and general prohibition of nuclear testing would create good prerequisites for the rapid development of an agreement on strategic arms.

This, Mr. President, is the packet of our proposals on all the basic aspects of reducing nuclear weapons. I propose that you and I, here in Reykjavik, give directives to our appropriate departments—the ministries of foreign affairs and others—for the joint development of agreements which we could coordinate and sign during my visit to Washington.

In this context, I would like to emphasize once again that the Soviet Union is interested in the effective and reliable control over measures for disarmament, and is ready to implement it by any means needed, and by means of on-site inspections. We are awaiting such an approach also from the United States.

I have spoken here of some very serious things, and in order to avoid any ambiguity, I would like to give you an English translation of the standard text of what I have said.

Reagan: We are very encouraged by what you have presented here. Of course, I also noted certain divergences in our positions as concerns strategic and intermediate-range missiles. For example, in our position, reaching the zero point on intermediate-range missiles in Europe also requires the reduction of Soviet missiles in Asia, which may be aimed at Europe under conditions when the USA no longer has any means of deterrence there. Such a situation is not suitable to us. We propose the reduction of Soviet missiles in Asia, or instead of zero—the reduction of Soviet and American missiles in Europe to 100 units, so that the US would still have a means of deterrence. On strategic arms, we want to attain reduction of this class of weapons to zero. And here I would like to draw a line to the ABM Treaty. As I already said in Geneva, we viewed SDI as an idea having significance only under conditions of liquidation of strategic weapons. Therefore, we are proposing to you, at the same time as reduction in the number of these arms, to sign an agreement which would replace the ABM Treaty. This agreement would provide for both sides to conduct research in the sphere of defensive arms within the framework of laboratory testing permitted by the ABM Treaty. However, when either of the sides approaches the limits, going outside the framework of the ABM, then the tests could be conducted in the presence of the other party. If, for example, we were the first to reach this boundary, then we would invite you to observe the testing of such systems. And if the tests

showed the possibility and practical expediency of creating a defensive system, then this agreement would obligate us to share this system with the other side. In exchange, the parties would promise to fully liquidate strategic arms, and within a period of 2-3 years would agree in the course of negotiations on such a system of mutual use of such systems. The reason for such an approach consists of the fact that each of the sides will retain the capacity for production of offensive weapons: After all, we had it before, and we need a guarantee that no one will create it anew, whether this be either of our two sides or some maniac like Hitler, who will want to create offensive weapons. We will need a defense against this. And we propose to protect ourselves once and for all against the rebirth of strategic arms in the world, and on this basis to build our future for many years.

Gorbachev: Let me react briefly to your comments. First of all, we view your statements as being preliminary. I have just presented entirely new proposals, and they have not yet been discussed at any negotiations. Therefore, I ask you to give them proper attention and to express your reaction later. Secondly, what you have said is on the same level and in the same plane as what the American participants in the negotiations in Geneva say. We value the efforts of experts on the detailed development of questions, but they have not moved matters ahead. We need a new input, a new impulse. We want to create it with our proposals. But how is the American side acting? We are proposing to accept the American "zero" in Europe and to sit down at the negotiating table on Asia within the framework of the medium-range missile problem, while you are retreating from your former position. We do not understand this. In regard to ABM defense. We are proposing to retain and strengthen this fundamentally important agreement, while you propose rejecting it and destroying the mechanism which creates the basis for strategic stability. We do not understand this. About SDI. You need not worry. We have gotten to the bottom of this question, and if the USA creates a three-level system of ABM defense, we will find an answer. We are not concerned by this, but rather by the fact that SDI would mean a transfer of the arms race to a new environment, its elevation to a new stage, the creation of new types of weapons which would destabilize the strategic situation in the world. If that is the goal of the US, then we can still understand its position. But if it wants stronger security for its people and for the entire world, then its position contradicts that goal and is directly dangerous.

Concluding my reaction to your comments, I would like to express the hope that you, Mr. President, will carefully review our proposals and give an answer, point by point, on what you agree with, what you do not agree with, and what disturbs you.

Reagan: We will continue our discussion of these questions in the second half of the day. For now I will make only one comment. If we were to propose studies in the sphere of strategic defensive systems under conditions where we would reject the reduction of offensive

weapons, we could be accused of creating a cover for a first strike. But our position is not such. We propose the rejection of offensive strategic systems. The agreement which I have proposed would prohibit us from expanding a strategic defensive system until we reduced offensive arms. This system would be our protection and yours in case of unforeseen situations, a sort of gas mask. After all, when the use of chemical weapons was prohibited after World War I, we did not reject gas masks. They were the guarantee of our protection against such a weapon in case someone decided to use it. And the methods of creating such a weapon are known. It is exactly the same with offensive strategic weapons. We need a gas mask here. But we can discuss this in more detail at the next meeting.

Gorbachev: Alright. We will continue the discussion in the same complement.

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Russian Commentary Questions Sales of Nuclear Materials

*PM1005171793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 8 May 93 First Edition p 7*

[Commentary by Petr Belov under the "Viewpoint" rubric: "We Sell Uranium, We Disclose Classified Information... Who Reaps the Benefit?"]

[Text] Recently the newspapers reported the sale at a fabulously low price of Russian strategic uranium reserves and the organization of a joint experiment to improve ABM defenses.

Let me remark that these deals, which are profitable only to the United States, are served up by our mass media as Russian initiatives. What is more, we are supposedly foisting them on the United States, trying to win them over, and beating our breasts—when suddenly these ambitious Americans grow stubborn. And in order to persuade them to "meet us halfway," we can see our way to incidentally lowering the price of uranium and plutonium and making the terms of the experiment such that under them the essence of our latest design and technological achievements in the sphere of plasma and gas dynamics is disclosed, that is to say, yet another leak of information takes place, making further cooperation unnecessary.

How is it possible to agree to bargain sales of strategic reserves of uranium and plutonium, whose value will rise continuously as natural energy sources are exhausted? Even today their value exceeds that of our gold reserve, in the opinion of Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov. The profitability of the deal in question amounts to 2,500 percent, but not for Russia—for the United States. That is today. Who has calculated the energy costs of the 21st Century? Is it permissible in

these conditions to disregard the interests of our descendants by concluding such long-term contracts (for 20 years) for a miserly sum—\$13 billion?

The sale of nuclear materials at ridiculously low prices cannot facilitate international stability either. Such actions deprive us of the possibility, in the event of unfavorable circumstances, of sharply increasing our defense capability, while the preserve the U.S. potential for doing so. And who will vouchsafe that this will not provoke Washington, for example, to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty or from the START-II treaty which is currently being discussed in the Russian Supreme Soviet?

Our initiative on the use of plasma weapons to disable missile warheads is really dangerous to international stability. It is fundamentally impermissible, in my view, because it sets a precedent for testing ABM weapons operating on new physical principles. It is even more unacceptable to stage joint tests without prior multilateral discussion of the concrete restrictions on such principles and elements laid down in the 13 June 1972 Agreed Statement regarding the ABM defense limitation treaty.

Incidentally, it is possible to satisfy oneself that the initiatives on joint experiments are not Russia's by studying the memorandum of the Heritage Foundation "brain trust" entitled: "Making the World Safe for the United States," published exactly one year ago. The actual idea of using plasma weapons is not new, including using them to destroy such targets as missile warheads, whose flight in dense atmospheric strata is accompanied by the formation of an area of superheated and therefore ionized gas. If such objects encounter another area of equally ionized gas in their way, by the laws of interaction between electrically charged bodies (in our case plasma formations) forces arise between them which can alter the warhead's trajectory and in certain circumstances even destroy it.

It is possible to envisage not just the theoretical but also the technical, realization of a large-scale experiment acting on one, at the most two warheads. It is this interest, scientific more than anything else, and also a natural desire for cooperation which explains the birth of the idea under examination in some circles of the Russian military-industrial complex. And this is perfectly natural, as is their desire for additional funding, foreign business trips, and so forth.

"Our" proposal on the joint experiment will most likely not go unnoticed. But we risk not only squandering our intellectual resources but also giving a direct motive for violating the ABM Treaty. Surely the "global defense of the United States and its allies" (the goal of the experiment) contradicts the requirements of Article 1.2: "not to deploy ABM systems for the defense of its country's territory and not to create a base for its defense;" while the experiment itself contradicts Article 5.1: "not to

create, not to use, and not to deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

There is another paradoxical "exchange"—of the expertise of tens of thousands of scientific projects by the Soros Fund, allegedly with the aim of assessing the prospects of implementing and funding them. The real value of the ideas in question is valued in billions. Only around a hundred inventors have actually been paid though, and even they have received only \$500 each. In the same way the aforementioned experiment could bring the United States savings of \$30 billion against costs of \$300 billion. But how much do we get out of it?

Of course, it can be objected: We are faced with ruin, we have no funds, there is nowhere for weapons-grade uranium or plutonium to go; the Tomsk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies is against shipping in and constructing a storehouse for nuclear materials. Or, for instance, Armaz-16 deputies are against dismantling nuclear warheads. What is to be done? After all, they are promising billions for joint work on ABM defense; and promising to withdraw COCOM restrictions. Are these not good arguments? True, the West does not keep all its promises...

The best solution to crisis situations, as is well known, is to avoid getting into them. The experience of recent years in our foreign policy testifies to the need for a corresponding law regulating the procedure for preparing foreign policy initiatives and establishing personal responsibility for their implementation.

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

Party Leader on Conditions for Ratifying START I

*LD1105160093 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 0500 GMT 11 May 93*

[Text] The START I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol could be ratified by the Supreme Council of Ukraine, provided the western states meet such conditions as guaranteeing security and providing financial and other assistance to our country. This was announced in Warsaw by Vitaliy Zhuravskyy, chairman of the Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine [CDPU]. He is taking part in the conference of the European Democratic Union. The CDPU leader also stressed that Ukraine must adhere to the policy of consistent and balanced reduction and elimination of all kinds of nuclear arms, but it must tackle this problem proceeding from its own national interests.

Russian Plans Initiated To Phase Out Obsolete Missiles

*LD1305195593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1923 GMT 13 May 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow May 13 TASS—Four regiments of strategic missile forces will discontinue their operational vigil from May 14. Forty intercontinental ballistic missiles will be removed from operational status, although the Russian parliament has not considered and has not ratified the START-2 treaty.

The removal of 40 missiles from operational status has no bearing on the START-2 treaty and there can be no question of any one-sided disarmament, Colonel General Igor Sergeyev, commander-in-chief of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, told IZVESTIYA's military news analyst.

"This is a routine measure. The missiles which we remove from operational duty belong to the second generation of national ICBMs which have already exceeded the combat service length, the general said.

A further increase in the number of such missiles is inadmissible due to both a sharp increase in operational costs and safety considerations. By 1995, according to Sergeyev, approximately 60 percent of all missile systems will become obsolete.

Notwithstanding that, the combat readiness of strategic missiles forces will not decline in any way. The obsolete systems will be replaced by up-to-date ones, General Sergeyev said.

When asked whether a delay in the ratification of the START-2 treaty in the parliament affects the combat state of missile forces, the general said: "We are in a state of high combat readiness and will maintain it subsequently as well."

At the same time Sergeyev said: "We now effect natural, routine cutbacks. But if the treaty ratification process is dragged out, cutbacks can eventually create advantages for one of the parties to the treaty and result in an upsetting of balance in strategic forces in favour of the U.S."

This would seriously damage the disarmament process and the building of international confidence, the general maintains.

Russian Commander on Strategic Missile Update Program

*PM1705152193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
14 May 93 First Edition pp 1, 2*

[Military observer Viktor Litovkin report on interview with Colonel General Igor Sergeyev, commander in chief of Russian Strategic Rocket Forces; date and place of interview not given: "START-II Not Yet Ratified, But Russia and United States Already Removing Obsolete Missiles From Duty"]

[Text] On 14 May the four Strategic Rocket Troops regiments stationed in the environs of Yoshkar-Ola (Republic of Mari El), the settlement of Bershet (Perm area), and the stations of Drovyanaya and Svobodnyy

in Transbaykal are terminating the performance of alert duty. Although the Russian parliament has still not considered or ratified the START-II Treaty, 10 RS-12 ICBMs, known in the West as the SS-13, and 30 RS-10 ICBMs (SS-11) are being withdrawn from the ICBM effective combat strength.

Our military observer Viktor Litovkin asked Colonel General Igor Sergeyev, commander in chief of Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, to comment on this event.

Actually, the withdrawal of 40 of our missiles from our strength level has nothing to do with the START-II Treaty and there can be no question of any unilateral disarmament, the commander in chief said. This is a planned measure. The missiles that we are taking out of silos—and they include the famous "100" or UR-100K—belong to the second generation of our ICBMs. They were brought in to operation at the end of the sixties by the late Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolay Krylov.

In its combat specifications and performance characteristics the UR-100K corresponds to the U.S. Minuteman-2. It is a single-warhead, liquid-propellant missile with very corrosive fuel, but it had already been "ampou-lized," and that had enabled it to be on alert status in a fueled state up to the present time. The missile's launch weight is 50 tonnes and its throw-weight is over a tonne.

All periods in which these missiles could be kept on alert status have now expired. Both the guaranteed service life, which ended 8 years ago, and the prolonged operational service life. A further increase in them is impermissible because that would mean a sharp increase in operational expenditures and because of safety conditions. By 1995 approximately 60 percent of all the missile systems will have become obsolete, and we will be forced to remove them from alert status. Irrespective of the START-II Treaty's ratification.

But the combat readiness of Strategic Rocket Forces will not decrease one iota. The RS-10 and RS-12 will be replaced by up-to-date RS-12M (SS-25) mobile missile systems. They outperform the "100" in all respects. First, they possess great survivability, combat effectiveness, and accuracy. Second, they are more reliable and economical in operation; they have great efficiency and flexibility of combat command and control. Third, they are universal and can be used in both the mobile version and, after modernization, in the stationary version.

The RS-12 M missile's specifications and performance characteristics fully meet the required level of effectiveness. It is an intercontinental, solid-propellant missile equipped with the most up-to-date guidance system, and it can be readied from any location in a matter of seconds. It has a single warhead. The launch weight is 46 tonnes and the throw-weight 1 tonne.

I asked the general what would happen to the crews of the launchers being removed from alert status, the

officers and warrant officers of the regiments being disbanded, and their families.

"We are trying not to lose a single man," Col. Gen. Sergeyev said. "The removal of obsolete systems from alert status is a planned, smooth process. We prepared for it in advance. It will enable us to redistribute specialists to the sectors where they are currently in short supply. The shortage of missilemen is very great, as is the case throughout the Army."

Those who have served the prescribed periods, the commander in chief says, will be discharged into the reserves. We will try to provide them with apartments and all the essentials. The remainder will take the places of officers who have gone to Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine, and their other native states. Some of those left will be retrained in the new system.

Thus, for example, in Bershet we have up-to-date ICBM railroad systems. Officers and warrant officers from the disbanded regiment which had UR-100Ks will, after appropriate retraining, be transferred to serve in them.

We are not losing a single unit of our social infrastructure in military camps (housing, kindergartens, schools, hospitals, stores), nor are we losing combat guidance and control systems. On the contrary, we are going to construct more.

"How are things going with cutting the U.S. missile potential? Are they waiting for ratification of the START-II Treaty; are they improving their strategic forces?" I inquired of the general.

"I can tell what specifically is happening in U.S. strategic offensive forces only from information I obtain from the open press, reports from independent international institutes, and General Staff materials," says Sergeyev, who has never himself been across the ocean.

I know that since 1991 they have cut the total number of delivery platforms by 10 percent or 195 units, while the number of nuclear warheads has decreased by 22 percent or approximately 2,500. I think that this too is a smooth process which does not depend on the START-II Treaty. Like us, they are removing old systems from operational status—the Poseidon S-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile and B-52 strategic bombers. They are being replaced by more up-to-date, economic, and effective systems.

In the United States the program to qualitatively improve the strategic offensive forces' nuclear triad continues to operate. Structural command and control of them is also being improved. Last year, for example, a unified strategic command was created, which was made responsible for the functions of operational command and control of all three constituents of the strategic forces: land-based ICBMs, sea-based nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines with submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and aviation—heavy bombers.

Here, the general noted, I would like to draw your attention to the following peculiarity. Previously, both in our country and theirs, a new system was not adopted and the old one was not removed while on alert status. Now old ones are being removed but new ones are not always being introduced. And even if they are being introduced, it is in a considerably smaller volume than previously.

Quotas and the strategic balance remain approximately equal, but the accents have been changed. There is greater trust in each other and predictability of behavior, and greater concern for the safety of strategic facilities, the orderly state of nuclear complexes, and the impermissibility of unauthorized use of ICBMs, and this inspires optimism.

We are not in fact reducing combat readiness requirements, Gen. Sergeyev says. They have in some places become tougher.

When talking to the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces commander in chief I naturally could not miss the opportunity to ask about the technical condition of the missile complexes located in Ukraine and about what has changed there following the item in IZVESTIYA and the contacts between the two countries' missilemen held since then.

We are carrying out joint practical work to maintain the missile complexes in Khmel'nitskiy and Pervomaysk in a minimum technically safe condition, Gen. Sergeyev said, within the constraints of our available resources. Unfortunately, no interstate agreement on design and guarantee supervision [avtorskiy i garantiynny nadzor] over these complexes has yet been signed, ownership questions have not been resolved, and the Ukrainian parliament has not ratified the START-I Treaty. Without this the problems concerning the safety of nuclear missile weapons will only get worse.

I asked the Strategic Rocket Forces commander in chief about one other thing. Is the delay over the ratification of the START-II Treaty in the Russian parliament affecting the rocket forces' combat state?

"It has not affected us at all so far," the general replied. "We are and will remain in a state of high combat readiness. I am sure that, granted any treaty restrictions, by virtue of the qualities objectively inherent in them and moreover with minimal expenditure on their maintenance and development compared with other branches of the service the Strategic Rocket Forces will retain their leading role in Russia's nuclear triad and remain a reliable stabilizing and deterrent factor."

Natural, planned cuts are under way in our country now, but if the treaty ratification process is protracted they could ultimately create an advantage to one of the participants and lead to a sharp imbalance in strategic forces in favor of the United States. That would seriously

harm the disarmament process and the strengthening of international trust, the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces commander in chief said.

Secretary Christopher Cited on START II Ratification

PM1305141793 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 13 May 93 p 3

[Mikhail Pogorelyy report: "START II Treaty Benefits Everyone"]

[Text] Preliminary hearings in connection with the ratification of the START II Treaty have begun in the U.S. Congress. Secretary of State Warren Christopher was the first to address the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. This is a historic agreement, he said, one which ensures an adequate level of security for both the United States and Russia and at the same time strengthens international stability and paradoxically removes nuclear arms control as the main issue in relations between the two countries.

START II is the logical extension and development of the START I Treaty, but whereas the first agreement envisages eliminating half of the heavy missile launchers, under the second they are all to be destroyed—along with the missiles themselves. According to the provisions of START II, MIRVed ICBMs, seen as the most destabilizing arms systems, are to cease to exist. In this connection Claiborne Pell, chairman of the Senate committee, said the following: "Without START I there would be no second treaty." These sentiments seem to predominate in the Russian parliament too. But there are grounds if not for alarm then for concern.

Having suddenly become subjects of world nuclear diplomacy following the breakup of the USSR, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus have for various reasons taken up disparate positions. Under the Lisbon Protocol to the START I Treaty they pledged to rid themselves of the nuclear weapons stationed on their territory, adopt nuclear-free status, and subscribe to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. That is, effectively to become states that do not have and do not aspire to have such weapons. In practice only the Belarusian side has gone all the way down that road. Kazakhstan, after ratifying START I, unexpectedly dragged its feet in considering membership of the "nonnuclear club." The Ukrainian authorities are for the time being making do with general declarations of intent without taking concrete, legally valid steps.

Meanwhile the Russian parliament ratified START I with the proviso that the treaty would only come into force once our immediate neighbors fulfilled the above commitments. According to the head of the U.S. diplomatic service, legislators in the "refractory" republics will start examining these problems in the near future. However, the secretary of state recalled, there should be a time for everything—a time for discussion and a time for action...

According to him, the United States stands to gain from START II since the nuclear threat to it is considerably lessened. Russia, free of the burden of rapidly outdated arsenals, will be able to channel funds into maintaining smaller but more efficient and modern strategic forces, while at the same time developing a market economy; and its neighbors also stand to gain in terms of security from the considerable reduction in Russia's nuclear potential, Christopher concluded.

Ukrainian, Russian Officials on Strategic Arms

93WC0066A Moscow FEDERATSIYA in Russian
No 43, 17 Apr 93 (signed to press 16 Apr) p 6

[Statements by Ukrainian and Russian officials: "Nuclear Weapons Cannot Have Two Masters"]

[Text] What are Kiev's true intentions on the question of the nuclear missiles of the former Union which remain on Ukrainian territory? Does the leadership of Ukraine really want to hand them over to Russia or does it intend playing for time, seeking every conceivable diplomatic and legal reason "to wait and not give back"?

Generally, all that is happening today in connection with the nuclear weapons in Ukraine is very reminiscent of the celebrated "Neither war nor peace" principle. So Kiev also: while formally recognizing the need for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory, it is at the same time not giving them back (on various pretexts, what is more).

The Russian press has been reprimanded repeatedly for lack of objectivity and partiality in relation to independent Ukraine. Reluctant to listen to new reprimands, our newspaper is making available to an equal extent a free platform on so important a question to all parties to the confrontation: both Ukrainian and Russian. And, thank God, this confrontation is diplomatic as yet.

The opinion of the Russian side on this problem was set forth in the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation at a news conference conducted in connection with a statement of the Government of Russia.

Although the news conference has been covered in the media, specific arguments and statements set forth by spokesmen for the Ministry of Defense and the Foreign Ministry of Russia have not been given in the press. We express our thanks to the Department of Information and the Press of the Foreign Ministry of Russia for the verbatim record of the news conference which it made available.

Ukraine's Position

Vadim Dolganov, information and press counselor of the Embassy of Ukraine in Moscow:

Ukraine's position is perfectly straightforward—we declare it in the Declaration of State Sovereignty

(adopted by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine on 16 July 1990). This declaration is the cornerstone of Ukrainian statehood.

In the light of this all charges against Ukraine to the effect that we wish to join the nuclear club are absurd and groundless for we could have joined it automatically, upon the disintegration of the USSR (having inherited 16 percent of the Union's nuclear potential), but the whole point is that 18 months (!) prior to the collapse of the USSR Ukraine proclaimed (in the above-mentioned declaration) an aspiration to nuclear-free status.

A question which is being put to Ukraine constantly: "Are you a nuclear or nuclear-free power?" also, therefore, appears absurd. Such a formulation is, in our opinion, improper. Ukraine is a state on whose territory the nuclear weapons of the former USSR are located. These nuclear weapons do not belong to Ukraine but neither do they belong to Russia (!)—they are the property of the deceased Union. Ukraine has carried out the first part of the actions in respect to the START I Treaty obligations: All tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Ukrainian territory completely in May 1992.

The situation as regards strategic arms is more complex: Any nuclear missile silo is a vast infrastructure, which it is difficult to eliminate in a trice. According to the most initial estimates, the elimination of all strategic nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory, on the other hand, will cost approximately 1.5 billion (!) U.S. dollars. In this connection Ukraine expects material and technical assistance on the part of the major world nuclear powers (Russia included). But aside from material and technical assistance, Ukraine wishes to obtain dependable guarantees (primarily on the part of Russia and the United States)—guarantees of our nuclear safety.

Now as concerns ratification of START I. The treaty was submitted in December 1992 by Kravchuk, president of Ukraine, for discussion and ratification to the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine.

It is important to note that Ukraine is not concluding this treaty (START I) but merely subscribing to it, which requires a close study of all articles of the treaty with regard for our national interests. The U.S. Congress considered the START I Treaty for a whole year. We, on the other hand, are being pushed into the ratification of START I practically without study and detailed criticism, which, in our view, is utterly unrealistic.

Recently the concern of the parliament of Ukraine in the context of discussion of the START I Treaty has risen sharply in connection with the internal political events in the Russian Federation. I refer to statements of high officials about Ukraine and the attempts of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation and the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia to interfere in the internal affairs of a state which is entirely independent of them (discussion at the Seventh Congress and the meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, for example, of the so-called "Crimea question").

The fact of the registration by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation of extremist organizations whose mission is the revival of the USSR (like the Front for the National Salvation of Russia, for example) cannot fail to make us wary also.

The leadership of Russia is also pretending that it does not notice the mob gatherings of former all-Union members of parliament calling themselves the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR.

There is no such congress nor is there such a country as the USSR nor, consequently, are there people's deputies of the USSR.

All the facts which I have mentioned are putting the parliament of Ukraine increasingly on its guard. But Ukraine is intimidated most by the intensifying political contradictions in Russia and the fact that even senior officials of the Russian Federation are talking increasingly about the possibility of a new civil war arising on the territory of Russia.

On the other hand, as far as the START II Treaty is concerned, at the end of 1992 even Kravchuk, president of Ukraine, expressed Ukraine's official position. We support any nuclear arms limitation agreements, but Ukraine has nothing to do with the START II Treaty since all the nuclear arms deployed on the territory of Ukraine fall wholly under the START I Treaty.

Russia's Position

Grigoriy Berdennikov, deputy foreign minister of Russia:

...Back in 1992 Ukraine, in conjunction with Kazakhstan and Belarus, assumed the pertinent commitment. It is a key component of the Lisbon Protocol concluded in May 1992 by Russia, the United States, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, according to which the successors of the Soviet Union—Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus—were deemed parties to the START I Treaty. At the same time, on the other hand, inasmuch as Russia is a nuclear power, the three others, that is, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, undertook to subscribe to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as nonnuclear states and also to eliminate these weapons currently deployed on their territory within a period not exceeding 7 years.

There are also other commitments of Ukraine (within the framework of the CIS they took effect, incidentally, as of the day the corresponding documents were signed) to the effect that it undertakes to eliminate the nuclear weapons on its territory before the end of 1994. In addition, a decision was adopted in the summer of 1992 on the CIS states' affiliation to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which was also signed by Ukraine. According to this, the Commonwealth countries support the Russian Federation in its continued affiliation to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a state possessing nuclear weapons, and the other successors of the former

Soviet Union, except for the Russian Federation, subscribe to this treaty as states which do not possess such weapons.

Unfortunately, almost a year has elapsed since the conclusion of the Lisbon Protocol, "and the cart is still there," at least as far as Ukraine and Kazakhstan are concerned. Belarus adopted the wise decision on ratifying the START I Treaty and subscribing to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a nonnuclear state.

If an expansion of the range of states possessing nuclear weapons is allowed to occur, this could jeopardize the entire nuclear nonproliferation regime and serve as a very dangerous precedent for other so-called "near-nuclear" countries.... For this reason we have an interest in the commitments voluntarily assumed by Ukraine and Kazakhstan being discharged as quickly as possible.

Colonel General Boris Gromov, deputy minister of defense of Russia:

Adding to what has already been said, I would like to share the following thoughts on the purely military aspect of the subject of the negotiations. The situation which has taken shape today in connection with the nuclear weapons temporarily deployed on the territory of Ukraine has recently been giving rise to ever increasing concern, in the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation included.

Contrary to the declaration on the nuclear-free status of the republic, the Ukrainian leadership is implementing practical measures which testify to its aspiration to possess these weapons. Thus Edict No. 209 of the president of Ukraine of 5 April 1992 and, following it, the order of the defense minister of Ukraine of 23 April of the same year incorporate the 43d Missile and 46th Air armies with the combat units and subunits (176 missile batteries and 43 strategic bombers) in the armed forces of Ukraine. In May 1992 the personnel of two nuclear-engineering units of the 46th Air Army, in which approximately 670 strategic nuclear munitions are deployed, took the Ukrainian oath. This led in practice to the establishment on the part of Ukraine of control of these weapons and their maintenance. This means essentially that the republic has acquired the possibility in principle—considering that the strategic bomber flying personnel has taken the Ukrainian oath also—of the use of nuclear weapons.

Constant pressure is being exerted for this oath to be taken also by the nuclear-engineering units of the 43d Missile Army. The subunits for guarding the missile batteries and nuclear munitions sites are being manned only by compulsory service personnel who are citizens of Ukraine.

Considering that it had officially declared its affiliation as soon as possible to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a state without nuclear weapons, the Russian side proposed that it place under its jurisdiction the

nuclear weapons which are temporarily deployed on the territory of Ukraine. As you have today been told, this proposal was rejected.

We put forward another solution: the decoupling as soon as possible, within 18 months approximately, from the ballistic missiles of the front sections and nuclear warheads in conjunction with warheads of long-range air-launched cruise missiles and their removal to the territory of Russia for subsequent destruction under Ukraine's supervision. And for the purpose of the total exclusion of the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons in the coming months the cancellation of training flight assignments for all of their delivery systems. Unfortunately, this proposal was rejected also.

As has already been said (during the second round of negotiations—2-3 March of this year), and I would like to emphasize this once more, it is obvious that the Ukrainian side has no intention of completely eliminating the strategic arms on its territory even within 7 years, as specified by the START I Treaty.

There was mention for the first time of the Ukrainian affiliation not of individual basic components of the nuclear munitions, as was said at the first round, but of the nuclear weapons. It was not fortuitous that this January a new authorized structure, whose name speaks volumes, was created in the republic's armed forces. This is the "Center for Administrative Control of Troops of the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine."

And the second round of negotiations showed that the Ukrainian position is geared in all its aspects to compelling Russia on the one hand to recognize the affiliation to Ukraine of the nuclear weapons on its territory and, on the other, to assuming responsibility for nuclear safety. And there is perfectly candid and unconcealed discussion of this. From our viewpoint, such an approach cannot be deemed constructive. Nuclear weapons cannot have two masters. Just as there cannot be two parties responsible for nuclear safety inasmuch as the fullness of such responsibility is borne by the party which maintains the nuclear weapons and nuclear munitions.

Individual statements of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, and not just of this ministry, to the effect that Russia is deliberately not supplying it with replaceable component units for the nuclear munitions and is using this as a means of pressure are totally without legal foundation. The Ministry of Defense of Russia is providing for the timely replacement of all component units for the nuclear munitions with Russian statehood. This precisely is how matters stand, and we have no problems with the assurance of nuclear safety on the territory of Belarus and Kazakhstan. The supply of such units for nuclear munitions which do not have Russian state affiliation would, it is absolutely clear, be regarded by the world community as a violation on Russia's part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. This is for us unacceptable.

Moscow Media Assesses Ukrainian Actions**Pro-Nuclear Ukrainian Republican Party Viewed**

*MK0605124693 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 6 May 93 p 3*

[Vladimir Skachko report under "Ukraine" rubric: "Republicans Favor Nuclear Ukraine. 'We Have Torn Moscow Away From the Ukrainian Nipple and Have Started To Get Mastitis'"]

[Text] The fourth congress of the new Ukraine's oldest political party—the Ukrainian Republican Party—has taken place. In his report Ukrainian People's Deputy Mikhail Goryn stated, commenting on the results of Ukraine's acquisition of independence: "Reality has exceeded the most pessimistic forecasts. The economic crisis is deepening, the living standard is falling unrestrainedly, and the number of paupers is increasing. In hospitals there are not enough medicines for sick children, and in schools there are not enough textbooks. The army is using an alien language, the Black Sea Fleet obeys the orders of Russian admirals. Like mushrooms after rain political parties propagandizing the wrenching of certain territories from Ukraine are growing. And on top of all this is an orgy of crime, with the law enforcement organs powerless. Ukraine is in dire straits, the profound administration crisis paralyzing its will." Presidential adviser Bogdan Ternopilskiy, one of the party's leaders, said: "We have torn Moscow away from the Ukrainian nipple and have started to get mastitis." He received stormy applause.

Despite attempts to find a foreign enemy to excuse internal disorders, however, most congress decisions concerned domestic problems. In the economics sphere the Republicans are advocating the acceleration of reforms and a structural perestroika in the economy. In their opinion, changes for the better can be achieved by overcoming the fuel and energy dependence on Russian power sources and the population's psychological unpreparedness for difficulties. The first must be solved by finding alternative oil and sources and by drawing up a large-scale energy conservation program, the second by accelerating unpaid privatization.

The Ukrainian Republican Party has once again come out as a pro-presidential party. The Republicans have criticized Leonid Kravchuk for handing over tactical nuclear weapons to Russia, flirting with the CIS, for what is in their opinion an incorrect cadre policy, and the Yalta-Dagomys process, but Goryn stated that if necessary to confirm real statehood, the Ukrainian Republican Party will come out in support of direct presidential rule.

Kuchma's government has been criticized for lacking a program of reforms and radical reformist steps, for its inability to "launch" reforms and become a cabinet of like minds. At the same time the Ukrainian Republican Party has stated that it will support the granting of

extraordinary powers to the government and will advocate the formation of a government of professional reformers without the Supreme Soviet's participation.

The most flak has been taken by parliament, whose hostages, in the congress' opinion, both President Kravchuk and the government have become—which to the old nomenklatura's advantage is blocking all progressive decisions. Therefore the Republicans, having declared the current system of soviets ineffective, advocated a radical reorganization of the representative branch and elections to parliament on a multiparty basis. The new Ukrainian Constitution, in the congress' opinion, must be adopted by a Constitutional Assembly and not the Supreme Soviet, as the existing constitution states.

But the Ukrainian Republican Party's position on nuclear weapons was most radical. In the opinion of its members, Ukraine now faces a choice: To be a strong European state or a "beet republic." The Ukrainian Republican Party therefore advocated Ukraine's recognition as a de facto nuclear state, which will participate in nuclear disarmament not unilaterally but with all the world's states. Until a collective security system and a global nuclear disarmament program have been created, the Ukrainian Republican Party proposes the following: To take full control of nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory; to create a Ukrainian command of strategic nuclear troops; to devise its own system of nuclear warning; to re-aim nuclear weapons according to the principle of "security in all directions;" and to provide Kravchuk with not only a control button, but also a launch button.

Commentary Says Ukraine's Nuclear Weapons Threaten Planet

LD0605215793 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1700 GMT 6 May 93

[Commentary by Aleksandr Gerasimov; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Russia has called on Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and other countries of the CIS to rapidly accede to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. This is stated in a working document presented by our state to the UN. Russia considers that one of the priorities of multilateral disarmament should be the consistent fulfillment of accords which have already been achieved. By the way, not everything is going well in this respect. [video shows mobile nuclear missiles, launch facilities, Ukrainian parliament and officials]

[Aleksandr Gerasimov, identified by caption] It seems that after a short pause, the strategic nuclear missiles of the former Soviet Union based in Ukraine are once again beginning to be used for their planned purpose—as an instrument of deterrence and a solid argument in political discussions, in this instance, Kiev's discussions with nearby and distant foreign countries.

Statements made 2 years ago by the newly independent Ukraine about the republic's nuclear-free status are taking on an increasingly eroded appearance. The idea is now going the rounds that if Ukraine gives up the strategic missiles it will no longer be taken into account and it will fall into the rank of third-ranking countries with the corresponding economic and political consequences.

A number of influential parties and movements have already worked out a program for turning Ukraine into a real nuclear power, from setting up their own nuclear forces command to retargeting the missiles according to the principle of "security in all directions." Moreover, military specialists say that technically this task is quite feasible.

At the present time, all of the 1,250 nuclear warheads stationed in Ukraine are officially considered to be Russian and are operationally subordinated to Russia, although in effect this subordination is purely formal and [Ukrainian] President Kravchuk has even been given the right and possibility of forbidding the launch of missiles. Moscow generals assert that the Ukrainian military administration puts all sorts of obstacles in the way of Russian specialists to prevent them from gaining access to launch installations, thus leaving the missiles without the necessary inspection.

The chief of staff of the strategic missile forces considers that no one can today guarantee the complete safety of the nuclear missiles in Ukraine. So, Kiev's political arguments are being paid for by vast risks, not only to the citizens of that republic but perhaps of the whole planet.

France To Aid Ukraine With Nuclear Safety, Investment

*LD0805165293 Kiev UKRINFORM in Ukrainian
1113 GMT 8 May 93*

[Text] [No datelined as received]—France has allocated approximately 20 million francs for the development of the Ukrainian economy, in particular for the implementation of a scheme to ensure nuclear safety in Ukraine. In addition, another 80 million francs have been set aside for assistance to Ukraine as a contribution toward the relevant EC fund. This was stated by (Claude Villain), the representative from the Interdepartmental Mission for Cooperation with central and eastern Europe, at a news conference on the results of his visit to Kiev, which was organized at the French Embassy.

In reply to a question as to whether France's Government is not linking—as the U.S. Government is doing—the granting of credits to Ukraine with the implementation of certain political demands, French Ambassador to Ukraine Michel Peissik said that the development of Ukrainian-French cooperation does not depend on Ukraine ratifying international agreements on nuclear disarmament, although France undoubtedly has an interest in Ukraine's non-nuclear status. In the opinion

of the ambassador, the United States could in time change its tough position on this issue.

Evaluating the potential possibilities of Ukraine, (Claude Villain) noted that in terms of rendering financial assistance, it is one of the most promising of the 27 countries of central and eastern Europe which the mission is engaged in crediting.

Expressing the opinion of French businessmen, which coincides with the often expressed point of view of representatives of world business circles, [Villain] stressed the need to create a firm legislative base for investment in the Ukrainian economy. In contributing considerable funds toward assisting Ukraine in training management personnel, France hopes that this country might become its reliable economic partner in the near future.

Ukrainian Official in Warsaw Talks to Reporters About START

*AU0705175593 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish
4 May 93 p 4*

[Malgorzata Leczycka report: "Mutual Security and Economic Cooperation"]

[Text] "I have come to Warsaw to prepare the inaugural meeting of the Consultative Committee of the Presidents of Poland and Ukraine and discuss the conditions for its future work," Anton Buteyko, chief of the Ukrainian Presidential Service for International Affairs, told reporters. "During a preparatory meeting, we worked out plans for the Committee's future meetings, and we also adopted an agenda for the inaugural meeting, which will take place in Kiev."

"We decided," Buteyko continued, "that, in time for the first meeting, each side would prepare its own report on mutual relations, containing its own perception of these relations. Poland and Ukraine will each prepare a list of proposals and ideas on how further to improve our good relations. Each side will indicate how to resolve so-called difficult problems. Of course, everything will take place in accordance with the statute of the Consultative Committee of the Presidents of Poland and Ukraine. The proposals of our presidents concerning Polish-Ukrainian relations and international problems, especially the situation in Central and Eastern Europe, will also be examined."

Asked by POLSKA ZBROJNA whether Ukraine is a democratic state, Buteyko replied: "I believe so. We have a parliament elected out of various political groups, various bodies of authority are cooperating with each other, we observe human rights in accordance with international standards, we are successfully avoiding ethnic conflicts, and we guarantee the rights of ethnic minorities.

"Politicians have varying opinions on how to solve problems, but that is something quite normal and does

not constitute a conflict. I know that as far as the most important matters are concerned, Ukraine's leaders are capable of understanding each other very well. They know how to reach common decisions within the framework of the existing Constitution. President Leonid Kravchuk is our country's natural leader.

"Poland and Ukraine are interested in the economy and in security. An agreement on economic cooperation has been signed, and must now be implemented energetically."

As far as security is concerned, this was touched upon during Anton Buteyko's meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Pawel Laczowski and Minister Jerzy Milewski. "President Kravchuk's proposal to create a central European zone of stabilization and security is important, and of course the Committee will discuss it," Buteyko said.

Asked whether the process of forming the Ukrainian Army is complete, Buteyko replied that the legal side of the matter is complete. "In fact, all the structures that have already been adopted and made operational in the independent countries are already functioning in Ukraine. One can say that armed forces exist, but we are still in the stage of transforming them. Of course the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be reduced in accordance with the rules adopted by Parliament, taking into account the military doctrine which has already received its first reading in Parliament.

"The ratification of START-1 links Ukraine not only to Russia but to the entire world. However, because of the 'events in Russia,' as parliamentary sources in Kiev put it, the Presidium of the Ukrainian Parliament has postponed for an indefinite period its debate on ratifying it.

"As for the ratification of START-1, the situation is as follows," Buteyko explained. "Ukraine, in accordance with the stance of the Ukrainian Parliament, is to become a non-nuclear country. But it retains the right to financial compensation for, among other things, the fuel stored in nuclear warheads. In addition, Ukraine is asking for security guarantees.

"The process of destroying the nuclear weapons remaining on Ukrainian territory is also consuming considerable sums of money. We insist on financial assistance because Ukraine's economic situation is bad. We have no internal ambitions in this regard; the destruction of nuclear weapons is quite simply in the entire world's interest. Specific missiles were aimed at specific targets on the globe, therefore the destruction of these missiles will naturally increase the security of the countries they were aimed at."

U.S. Envoy Warns Ukraine of Possible 'International Isolation'

*PM1305171193 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
14 May 93 p 1*

[Aleksandr Golub report under the "Brief and to the Point" rubric: "Burdensome Missiles!"]

[Text] If Ukraine continues to retain nuclear arms on its territory and does not ratify the START I Treaty, this may result in the young state's international isolation. This thought was expressed by Roman Popadyuk, U.S. ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Ukraine, at a meeting with Ukrainian journalists. Elaborating on this thought, he said: If a normal democratic system is established, people would support this state. If the economy continues to decline further, no nuclear arms will be of any help.

Magazine Devotes Issue to Criticism of START II

Reader Questions Russian Motives

*93WC0061C Moscow DEN in Russian No 16,
1 May 93 (signed to press 22 Apr 93) p 4*

[Letter by Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) G. Rydanov, Bolshevo, Moscow Oblast, under rubric "A Reader's Letter"]

[Text] The absurdity, stupidity and antipopular direction of the START II Treaty, especially with respect to a reduction in silo-based multiple-warhead ballistic missiles, are obvious. As a former senior scientific associate of Military Unit 25840, the Russian Ministry of Defense main scientific research organization on ICBM basing, I would be interested in learning the attitude of its command representatives toward the Treaty.

Colonel V. Z. Dvornin, 57 years old, was unexpectedly appointed commander of Military Unit 25840. Why such trust? Colonel Dvornin should have been on pension long ago, but no, he receives a position with pretensions to a general's rank. Insofar as I know, Colonel Dvornin is famed for the fact that it was under his direction that a "theoretical substantiation" was made of the stupidities which are the basis of the START II Treaty with respect to a reduction in Russian ICBM's. I heard from former colleagues that Russian Federation Minister of Defense P. Grachev awarded the group of theorist-wreckers valuable gifts. And what else?..

START II Said To Discriminate Against Russia

*93WC0061B Moscow DEN in Russian No 16,
1 May 93 (signed to press 22 Apr 93) p 4*

[Article by Colonel (Reserve) V. Dmitriyev, candidate of technical sciences, and Captain 2nd Rank (Retired) G. Melkov, doctor of juridical sciences, professor: "Withdraw and Join No More"]

[Text] On 3 January 1993 in Moscow B. Yeltsin and G. Bush signed the Treaty on a Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II), in which, in the opinion of O. Sokolov, director of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department for Disarmament and Military Technologies Control, "by seizing the moment" (the departure of Bush from the post of U.S. president) to attain an optimum understanding, Russian diplomacy achieved "advantageous conditions for Russia". Just what are these "advantageous conditions for Russia" and are they advantageous to Russia at all?

After disintegration of the USSR the former USSR's strategic nuclear forces ended up on the territory of four independent states—Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. By virtue of this Treaty, START I, signed by presidents of the USSR and United States on 31 June 1991, almost completely lost practical meaning for the United States, since even without any reductions whatsoever Russia's strategic offensive arms ended up close to the framework specified by this Treaty, and the heads of the other three states undertook to remove nuclear weapons from their territory in the near term and make their countries non-nuclear.

There hardly will be anyone to deny that the USSR made serious concessions to the United States for the sake of getting the START I Treaty signed. But now, after disintegration of the USSR, even without counting sea-launched cruise missiles [SLCMs], in which the United States has overwhelming superiority, the United States obtained approximately a twofold superiority over Russia in the number of nuclear warheads on strategic offensive weapon delivery systems (in real terms the United States has 13,706 and Russia has 7,700), and this is without counting the nuclear warheads of U.S. allies Great Britain and France.

It seems U.S. leaders are not nurturing secret plans for war against Russia just now; however, one should not proceed from political motives of the moment or out of personal sympathy toward political leaders of western countries, including the United States, but out of the country's supreme interests and assurance of its security under all conditions of today and tomorrow and with any encirclement of states (friendly and unfriendly). It would seem that elimination of the strategic asymmetry unfavorable to Russia engendered by the START I Treaty should have been the obvious task of the new START II Treaty, this time directly between Russia and the United States, but the START II Treaty only aggravated this asymmetry.

1. The START II Treaty requires a radical change in the entire structure of Russia's strategic offensive arms, dictated by the specific nature of our military-geographic conditions and capacities of the former USSR's defense industry, whose creation took many years, the intellectual labor of our country's best scientists and specialists, and hundreds on hundreds of billions of rubles. What did we get as a result of signing the START II Treaty? By

2003 Russia will have to eliminate the very basis of its reliable nuclear missile shield, its most effective systems—MIRVed ICBMs, including heavy ICBMs which, by general recognition of military specialists, possess enormous potential for penetrating an ABM defense, practical invulnerability to conventional weapons, and high effectiveness in a surprise retaliatory counterblow.

Meanwhile, at one time it was the United States that was the initiator in creating multiple-warhead ICBMs in an attempt to get around those numerical limits on the number of delivery systems accepted on a treaty basis by the Soviet Union and United States. It was the United States that introduced these weapons to its strategic arsenal. Now it fears them most of all, inasmuch as multiple-warhead ICBMs also appeared in the USSR, and Russia now has them. The United States has no effective means of combating multiple-warhead ICBMs, nor does Russia, by the way. It is the multiple-warhead ICBMs which were, which are, and which will be for long years yet the most effective deterrent.

Multiple-warhead ICBMs are completely eliminated under the START II Treaty. "Now, when we actually are rejecting MIRVs, we arrive at greater stability and predictability and less temptation to resort to a first-strike strategy," believes Sokolov. But this is more than doubtful in our opinion.

First of all, there are clear criteria which were made the basis specifically of this option for reducing strategic offensive arms. On the one hand, multiple-warhead ICBMs, which are the basis of combat might of Russian strategic nuclear forces (known perfectly well by Russian Minister of Defense P. Grachev), are declared the most destabilizing and therefore subject to reduction and total destruction; on the other hand, the basis of U.S. combat might—missile-armed submarines equipped with ballistic missiles with medium-yield nuclear warheads capable of executing decapitating and disarming strikes against Russia in a matter of minutes on low-angle trajectories from waters contiguous with Europe—essentially have been declared by both sides to be a means which strengthens strategic stability.

Secondly, all competent military specialists, also including Grachev, know that in contrast to multiple-warhead SLBMs, ICBMs cannot be employed for a surprise preemptive strike inasmuch as their launch is immediately detected by the space echelon of the missile attack warning system and their flight duration (from 35 to 50 minutes) permits timely, effective retaliatory measures, which makes such a first strike simply senseless.

So what has stability, predictability and temptation got to do with it? Why not say frankly and openly that the United States was vitally interested in total elimination of such nuclear systems (multiple-warhead ICBMs), against which they have no effective countermeasures. In order not to waste funds senselessly on developing weapons against multiple-warhead ICBMs, the United

States agrees to give Russia money to destroy its multiple-warhead ICBMs. The United States achieved its goal by concluding the START II Treaty—it secured its territory against Russia's effective heavy ICBMs. But Russia's territory can be reached in a few minutes from European seas, not to mention the combat capabilities of aircraft and sea-launched and air-launched cruise missiles.

2. Just what is Russia offered in place of multiple-warhead ICBMs? No less than total rejection of the existing structure of strategic offensive arms and of reliance on silo-launched multiple-warhead ICBMs and a reorientation above all toward missile-armed submarines. The President of Russia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Security, the Russian General Staff and the CIS Combined Armed Forces Main Commissariat agreed with that approach.

Russia's missile-armed submarines do not represent a significant military threat to the United States at the present time. This is connected with the fact that the noisiness of our double-hulled submarines (all of them) exceeds that of U.S. analogues by 10-60 times. This increases the range of detection and destruction of our missile-armed submarines by U.S. ASW forces by many times. Eliminating this gap requires rejection of the construction of double-hulled submarines and a transition to building single-hulled ones, as in the United States, with use of the newest technologies, which Russia does not have. This very thing will require a minimum of 20 years. And for now Russia continues to build existing classes of submarines—targets which are dangerous to a greater degree not for the potential enemy, but for their own crews, literally tossing tens of billions of the people's rubles to the wind.

But even this is not enough. Any Russian submarine putting into the Atlantic Ocean beyond the Spitzbergen Island/Bear Island/North Cape (Norway) line or into the Pacific from Kamchatka or beyond the line of the Kurile Islands is immediately tracked with an accuracy to a submarine hull length by U.S. seabed acoustic tracking systems located on the floor of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and linked by underwater cable communication lines with shore centers for surveillance and vectoring of ASW forces and weapons. Russia has not had, does not have, and in the foreseeable future will not have similar equipment.

It is these systems and the increased noisiness of Russian submarines that back in peacetime nullify the combat stability and effectiveness of Russian strategic submarine forces.

In addition, ensuring effective operations by missile-armed submarines and increasing their survivability requires powerful general-purpose naval forces and the deployment of very sophisticated supporting systems, for which colossal material costs and much time are necessary. And this is what Russia simply cannot permit itself in the foreseeable period. "Tbilisi"-Class aircraft

carriers now in Russia's inventory also are only tempting targets of fabulous cost whose combat effectiveness essentially equals zero, and the overall status of surface combatants accepted from industry with an enormous amount of unfinished work and deficiencies through the fault of V. Chernavin absolutely do not support effectiveness of operations by strategic submarine forces.

Does Yeltsin and his entourage, Grachev and Ye. Shaposhnikov, know about the catastrophic state of the Russian Navy and submarine fleet? Yes, they do. Since 1983 a group of naval officers repeatedly have given packets of documents on the actual situation in the Navy to supreme leaders of the USSR and Russia, the KGB and Ministry of Security, ministers of defense of the USSR and Russia, procurator generals of the USSR and Russia (and the chief military procurator), and deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and Russia. Officers have spoken on radio and television and at international conferences and symposia in Moscow and abroad. Documents in particular were placed in the hands of or sent by mail with notification of delivery to M. Gorbachev (5 times), Yeltsin (7 times), D. Yazov, V. Kryuchkov, V. Bakatin, V. Chebrikov, N. Trubin, A. Katusev, V. Ochirov, L. Sharin, V. Lapygin, S. Stepashin, A. Kotenkov, A. Shchelkanov, Yu. Skokov, A. Rutskoy, Ye. Shaposhnikov, P. Grachev (one of the authors, G. Melkov, gave them to him personally), V. Stepankov and G. Burbulis. No one responded, except for the KGB [and] Ministry of Security of Russia. N. Galushko passed a finding to Stepankov on 6 February 1992 and the latter sent it on to Burbulis on 26 February 1992, outgoing M 30-1-211-92. No real steps were taken.

3. The START II Treaty permits reducing warheads by simply removing reentry vehicles [RVs] from missiles. The consequences of such a reduction have a clearly destabilizing character, since the RVs will be located in depots and can be promptly reinstalled with an exacerbation of the situation. And U.S. capabilities for such a build-up will be substantially greater (Russia 2,000, United States 4,000 warheads).

In other words, the reductions bear a fictitious nature. In addition, limitation levels are defined in such a way that Russia can attain them only with the deployment of over 600 single-warhead ICBMs, which will require enormous new expenditures. And all this at a time when hundreds of already operating, existing, effective, reliable means will be reduced. Here we are not even speaking about colossal outlays of money and materiel for rebuilding silos of multiple-warhead ICBMs.

4. The START II Treaty does not affect SLCMs and essentially does not prevent implementation of the U.S. SLCM Program, under which it is proposed to deploy up to 4,000 such missiles, while Russia's number of such missiles hardly will exceed one or two hundred. Is this really not a destabilizing factor?

5. Terms of the START II Treaty permit the Americans to remove 95 of the most modern B-1B strategic

bombers, capable of carrying 1,520 nuclear weapons, from the ceiling count of arms, and this at a time when Russia essentially lacks modern strategic aviation. There are 15 TU-160 heavy bombers on Ukrainian territory. Here we are not even speaking of the fact that it is not U.S. territory that is surrounded by Russian military bases but, to the contrary, Russian territory that is surrounded by military bases of the United States and its allies. Are these not destabilizing factors?

6. Reference to the fact that Russian SS-18 heavy missiles will exhaust their service life in the next 10-15 years and must be removed from the inventory inasmuch as they are not subject to replacement by similar systems also does not stand up to criticism. We also cannot share the enthusiasm of Sokolov, who believes that "the entire point and one of the chief advantages of this Treaty is that in parting with the heavy ground-based ICBMs, we essentially exchanged this inevitability for us for an equivalent reduction in U.S. strategic potential." But was the exchange good? Equivalent?

First of all, the United States got that exchange as an unexpected gift of enormous value: Russian multiple-warhead ICBMs against which the United States has no effective protection are being destroyed; a very effective weapon is being destroyed which is capable of reaching U.S. territory if necessary. Not all nuclear weapon delivery systems possess that capability. But Russian territory can be reached easily from any delivery systems of any state from any directions. Moreover, the United States even agrees to give dollars for destroying such Russian weapons. Of course it does...

Secondly, sooner or later other Russian nuclear weapon delivery systems, including mobile (ground and rail) ones, also will exhaust their service life; by the way, they are very dangerous to handle and operate and in case of an accident are capable of doing enormous harm to the environment and people perhaps comparable with Chernobyl. Operation of mobile missiles requires considerably greater material outlays compared with heavy silo-launched ICBMs.

And with respect to the impossibility of replacing the SS-18 with similar new systems in 10-15 years, this is a profound error impermissible for a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official.

If heavy multiple-warhead ICBMs are Russia's only effective weapon for self-defense against any potential aggressor, Russia must take all steps to retain these weapons, even undertaking a maximum reduction of any other nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

All treaties concerning nuclear weapons contain articles which state that by way of exercising its state sovereignty, each party has the right to withdraw from this treaty should it decide that exceptional circumstances connected with the content of this treaty threaten its supreme interests. It informs the other party of the decision it has made 6 months before withdrawing from this treaty. Such notification must contain a declaration

of the exceptional circumstances which the notifying party views as having threatened its supreme interests.

The expiration of the term of alert duty of SS-18 missiles, the extreme need for replacing them, the change in Russia's strategic position as a result of disintegration of the USSR, and the vital need for Russia to retain these very systems from a defensive standpoint specifically are such circumstances threatening Russia's supreme interests.

Thus, to retain its multiple-warhead ICBMs and protect the country's supreme interests in 10-15 years (by the end of the period of their alert duty), Russia can exercise its rights quite legitimately under any similar treaty, right down to withdrawing from such a treaty in accordance with its provisions and with advance notification to the other contracting party. Withdraw, so as not to "join" any more.

7. The clearly inequitable nature of the START II Treaty also is indicated by a comparison of intermediate and end results of a strategic offensive arms reduction. Counting reinstallation of RVs, Russia will have 6,206 and the United States 8,450 nuclear weapons after the first phase of strategic offensive arms reduction, a 1.0:1.36 ratio. Counting SLCMs Russia will have 6,306 and the United States 9,200-12,450, a 1.0:1.46-1.97 ratio. Counting reinstallation of RVs, Russia will have 4,750 and the United States 7,694 nuclear weapons following the second phase of reduction, a 1.0:1.62 ratio. Counting SLCMs Russia will have 4,850 and the United States 8,444-11,694, a 1.0:1.74-2.4 ratio. As we see, in the second phase the United States will surpass Russia in the number of nuclear weapons by almost two and one-half times, and this without counting nuclear warheads of Great Britain and France.

And it is not that Russia will have fewer nuclear warheads than the United States, but that the United States will have a feeling of total impunity no matter what measures it takes in the future with respect to Russia. The START II Treaty will give the United States full security, while Russia's security will become fiction.

The following conclusions can be drawn based on what has been said:

1. The START II Treaty is not in Russia's long-range national interests and cannot be ratified in its existing form by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet.
2. Guided by the country's supreme interests, Russia must under all circumstances retain the necessary number of multiple-warhead ICBMs for defense while consenting to the agreed-upon reduction and destruction of any other nuclear missile systems.
3. In our view, an equitable treaty with the United States in the strategic offensive arms area must contain the following elements: take account of all strategic offensive arms; not allow a fictitious reduction in the number of

RVs on ballistic missiles; permit each party to independently choose the structure of its strategic offensive arms; and mutually tie in the ban on deploying an ABM defense closely with a strategic offensive arms limitation.

START II, Global Protection System Scored

93WC0061A Moscow DEN in Russian No 16, 1 May 93
(signed to press 22 Apr 93) p 4

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Igor Ivanov: "START II and ABM Defense: Neither ABM Defense Nor Strategic Offensive Arms: The New Disarmament Treaty Takes Both Missiles and ABM Interceptors From Russia"]

[Text] Our nascent democracy finally has reached the shining heights at which public discussion is possible of the secretly developed START II Treaty, of enormous importance both to military security as well as to the Russian economy. As of the present time the majority of military analytical specialists working in the strategic security area do not know the real names of its authors. We would like to learn these names at upcoming parliamentary hearings; the Motherland should know its "heroes." Their arguments in favor of the present content of the START II Treaty would be interesting, and just whose calculations, recommendations and advice they used would be even more interesting...

Without awaiting a response to these questions, I would like to begin the conversation about START II with some comments concerning its vaunted profitability.

Within the scope of quotas established for aggregate numbers of weapons listed for deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, by 2003 Russia could have not 810 single-warhead ICBMs, but several hundred more, and the aggregate number of nuclear weapons on deployed systems of strategic offensive arms thus could be approximately equal for Russia and the United States.

But Russia will have to remove and partially eliminate all its ICBMs in the inventory by 2003 with the exception of 100-105 SS-19s (whose retention on alert status by that time is extremely problematical due to their lengthy periods of operation); replace the entire grouping of systems having single-warhead SS-25 missiles, which will be becoming physically obsolete by 2003, with its modernized analogue; eliminate 114 heavy ICBM silo launchers; physically destroy 204 heavy ICBMs; and refit the silo launchers preserved after the strategic offensive arms reduction for single-warhead ICBMs (which as a result will cost a very considerable amount).

Finally, it will be necessary to recycle tens of thousands of tonnes of a highly toxic substance, asymmetric dimethylhydrazine, the fuel of all liquid-fueled missiles being removed from the inventory. (It would be to the honor and praise of the American people, for whom many Russians feel deserved respect and sympathies, if they would help in a difficult time for Russia to resolve the difficult problem of recycling the highly toxic fuel.)

Let us turn to basic arithmetic. To begin with, let us analyze what is hidden behind paragraph 2a of Article III of this Treaty.

It is written in this paragraph that "it is not necessary to destroy the reentry vehicle [RV] platform of ICBMs or SLBMs which have a reduced number of warheads, or to replace it with a new RV platform."

What does this condition signify in practice in combination with paragraph 2c of that same Article III of the Treaty, which states that "each party has the right to reduce the number of warheads listed for each of no more than 105 ICBMs of one existing type by more than four but not by more than five warheads"?

For the United States both of these conditions mean retention after 2003 of 18 missile-armed submarines with 432 Trident SLBMs, each of which will be equipped with four RVs mounted on a platform designed for eight mounting seats. In addition, 500 Minuteman III ICBMs converted to single-warhead ICBMs also will have two "reserve" places on their platforms.

Nuclear warheads being removed from those U.S. missiles under the START II Treaty will be stockpiled at arsenals, inasmuch as the START II Treaty does not obligate the parties to physically eliminate them. MX ICBMs being removed from alert status also will go into the arsenals despite previous declarative statements by President G. Bush about their physical elimination and will be kept there together with their warheads on an equal basis with other "aged" missiles such as Polaris, Poseidon and Minuteman II.

Just what might occur in case one of the parties breaches the START II Treaty after 2003 as a result of deteriorating relations between Russia and the United States (possible in principle, as attested by numerous facts of recent history)?

It is not difficult to figure that in case the United States withdraws from the START II Treaty it will be capable, without building up the number of nuclear weapon delivery missiles, of increasing the aggregate number of nuclear warheads in its "dyad" (on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs) in a rather brief time to the level of 4,956, which is higher than the level envisaged by the START I Treaty!

And with silo deployment of 50 retained MX ICBMs in place of 50 Minuteman III's (the United States has more than enough experience in extending service lives of solid-fuel ICBMs), the aggregate number of warheads on the U.S. "dyad" already can be 5,306. Together with the number of weapons on deployed heavy bombers, this number will total 6,570, which also exceeds the aggregate number of warheads in the triad permitted by the START I Treaty!

And strictly speaking, how will Russia be capable of answering such a challenge without producing new missiles? In the worst case with nothing, i.e., with zero

additional warheads on its triad. In the best case, by accommodating an additional 500-525 warheads on SS-19 ICBMs doomed to become catastrophically obsolete (physically and morally) by 2003.

Thus, the START II Treaty potentially lays down a U.S. superiority over Russia of 1.65-1.9 times in the number of nuclear warheads in a period of possible confrontation, and by more than twofold counting warheads on strategic weapon systems of traditional U.S. allies France and England.

Recently the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and U.S. Secretary of State discussed the intent to conclude a treaty on reprocessing nuclear warheads being removed from strategic offensive weapon systems being reduced in Russia into fuel for U.S. atomic power plants with U.S. technical assistance.

Well, does the United States have too few weapons and working hands for their reprocessing or has the Russian land grown scarce in uranium ores? By no means. Then why should Russia destroy its warheads with weapons on a unilateral basis, including the newest warheads of its SS-18 and SS-24 ICBMs, in which colossal material outlays and the labor of thousands of people already are accumulated? It would be much more honest to conclude such a treaty on a parity basis, such as the following: one Russian warhead is reprocessed, and after it a U.S. warhead such as a Mk-88 (from a Trident II SLBM); a second Russian warhead is reprocessed, and after it a U.S. warhead such as a Mk-87 (from an MX ICBM) and so on.

Let us proceed further through the text of the START II Treaty.

It is written in the Treaty preamble: "The Russian Federation and United States of America . . . considering their obligations . . . under the Treaty Between the USSR and United States on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of 26 May 1972 . . . of a joint declaration on a global protection system . . . have agreed with the following..."

But this is nonsense, the enlightened reader will say: implementation of a joint global protection system project wrecks the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of 26 May 1972. And he will be absolutely right, inasmuch as adoption of the proposal for joint development of an ABM defense system facilitates U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, as it does, by the way, for Russia as well. But in Russia's present grievous economic state it would be suicidal to be drawn into games called "star wars" (although proponents of a different view on this problem probably will be found).

Well, what of it? the unenlightened reader will ask. Perhaps a joint global ABM defense system nevertheless is a boon for civilization? Perhaps it will serve to retard a further world arms race, serve as a guarantee of

strategic stability and, moreover, temporarily save some enterprises of the Russian defense establishment from economic failure?

To answer these questions without burdening the reader's attention with a presentation of the position on the SDI Program of such well-known public figures as Ye. Velikhov and R. McNamara, I propose to contemplate the following questions by taking a short historical excursion.

Did the appearance of nuclear weapons in the United States in 1945 strengthen security in the world? No. Did the appearance of nuclear weapons in the USSR in 1949 deprive France, England and China of the desire to possess their own nuclear potential so as to feel themselves secure in the nuclear era? Again, no. Is the desire of so-called third world countries to possess nuclear weapons for protecting their national sovereignty against any encroachments by members of the nuclear club despite enormous material costs explainable? Obviously, yes. And will other countries having a limited number of nuclear missile weapons feel themselves free of political pressure and blackmail on the part of countries who possess a global ABM defense system, and will the world be stable under these conditions? Obviously not.

At what conclusion are we arriving? An immediate, tremendous halt must be made to the idea of creating a joint global ABM defense system, and the regime of the ABM Treaty of 26 May 1972 must be strengthened. Only under these conditions does it make sense to carry on a conversation about parity reductions in strategic offensive arms at reasonable rates acceptable from military and economic standpoints and to reasonable limits.

And what does the START II Treaty propose in this regard?

It proposes to change the structure of Russia's nuclear triad to the manner of the U.S. triad, in which the main role is played by missile-armed submarines.

Is this good or bad? It depends on how you look at it.

If there is one-hundred percent certainty that the United States will not unilaterally violate the ABM Treaty in the foreseeable future, that structure seemingly promises nothing bad. But who will give this one-hundred percent guarantee? The Americans, who have spent enormous amounts on the SDI Program and who are not in the habit of dashing from extreme to extreme in policy as a whole and in military-technical policy in particular? Doubtful.

Having taken that position and of course after having heard Navy specialists (who, I hope, will find in themselves the boldness to forego their corporative interests if only temporarily in the interests of a just cause), you, dear Russian parliamentarians, will arrive at the interesting conclusion that the effectiveness of the naval component of Russian strategic offensive arms in retaliatory actions (and such actions specifically are dictated

by our defensive military doctrine) can be rather low in certain situations under conditions of deployment of the U.S. ABM defense system.

On the one hand, this is explained on a qualitative level by the vulnerability of missile-armed submarines to modern ASW weapons in a period of threat and a period of combat operations (to which, we all hope, matters never will arrive); on the other hand, again out of considerations for ensuring survivability, missile-armed submarines must not be brought together into a limited ocean area in a period of threat, and they cannot carry out a massive, quasisynchronous launch of missiles (for purely technical reasons due to the "slow" rate of fire inherent to both Russian and U.S. missile-armed submarines), which is extremely difficult for an ABM defense system to neutralize even with a space-based echelon.

But by virtue of their design and command and control features, a grouping of ground-based ICBMs is capable of executing a massive, essentially simultaneous retaliatory launch of missiles. And it is this circumstance, on condition of Russia's retention of highly survivable multiple-warhead ICBMs, that can prompt the United States to give up implementing the SDI Program.

Thus, consolidating the considerations expressed, it is possible and necessary to advise Russian parliamentarians to refrain from ratifying the START II Treaty and to revise its provisions toward an increase in Russia's military, economic and ecologic security.

Ownership of Heptyl Missile Fuel in Question

93WC0061D Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No 8,
13 Apr 93 p 3

[Article by Pavel Felgengauer under rubric "Neighbors": "Russia Is Ready To Take Ukrainian Heptyl"]

[Text] Last week Kiev and Moscow exchanged declarations and Ukraine reaffirmed "its right to ownership of nuclear components of weapons located on its territory . . . and to administrative control of strategic forces," which obviously contradicts basic provisions of the Treaty "On Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" for non-nuclear states.

Ambassador Yuriy Dubynin, head of the Russian delegation in talks with Ukraine, believes the Ukrainian declaration to be "unconvincing." He also declared to a SEGODNYA correspondent that Russia not only is ready to remove all "Ukrainian" nuclear warheads to its own territory for dismantling and recycling (which was announced earlier), but also "is ready at the very least to remove heptyl-fueled strategic missiles (together with the fuel) for destruction." In Dubynin's words, Russia now awaits a serious response from Kiev.

SEGODNYA reference: Heptyl is a chemically unstable, toxic, ecologically extremely dangerous missile fuel. A heptyl leak in cases of incorrect technical servicing of missiles has led more than once to catastrophes on land

and at sea both in the United States as well as in the USSR. Today there are up to 5,000 tonnes of heptyl in "Ukrainian" SS-19 missiles. There presently are no containers for storing it either in Ukraine or Russia. No one in the world for now has developed an ecologically safe technology for recycling significant volumes of heptyl.

Sverodvinsk Bans Nuclear Subs From Entering Port

LD1605210093 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1990 GMT 16 May 93

[Video report from Archangelsk by correspondent V. Loyter, identified from screen caption; from the "vesti" newscast]

[Text] The small soviet of Severodvinsk has adopted a decision banning nuclear submarines whose reactors are to be recovered from entering the port.

[Loyter] This decision was brought about by the inadequate reaction by the military and representatives of the nuclear shipbuilding center who, in accordance with the SALT II Treaty, were instructed to remove missile bays and to recover all nuclear materials. In their opinion, interference by local authorities will create tension in [the discharging of] international commitments.

There are no longer any submarines in the waters of the port on which the recovery of materials is taking place. In this connection, the small soviet states that, the military and their submarine partners have essentially displayed once again their attitude to the authorities and to the law by having begun work without any agreement with the bodies of state supervision.

Nevertheless, the strategic and financial problems of the country today should not be resolved at the expense of the inhabitants of Sverodvinsk. [Video shows harbor facilities]

Retired Russian Admiral on Submarine Deterrent and START II

PM0405143593 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 May 93 p 3

[Article by Rear Admiral, retired, Radiy Zubkov under the rubric "The Reader Continues the Discussion": "Why Not Go Further?"]

[Text] It seems to me that in the article "Treaty on Antisubmarine Defense Needed" (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 26 March 1993), Captain First Rank A. Demchenko raised a serious question connected not only with the ratification and implementation of the START II Treaty but also with the further strengthening of confidence and the development of cooperation and friendly relations between Russia and the United States.

The most important instrument for ensuring confidence during the reduction of strategic offensive weapons is the unconditional observance of the 1972 ABM Treaty. At

the same time this treaty, as is well known, is limited in character. If one takes a broad view of the ABM problem it should embrace not only measures to combat nuclear warheads already in flight but also the destruction of ICBMs themselves and their launchers, the withdrawal from service of control systems, and so forth. In this connection the sides, in my opinion, should long ago have reached agreement on the joint limitation of the possibility of delivering counterforce strikes, banning the development of and eliminating existing third-generation nuclear weapons, and possibly limiting ASW activity with regard to strategic missile-armed craft or banning them entirely in agreed zones.

All these things should have happened but so far have not. The fact that these questions remain unsettled causes natural concern to the Russian side and is an obstacle to the strengthening of Russian-U.S. confidence, which A. Demchenko's article indeed reflects. In fact the Americans on their Trident-system SSBNs [strategic nuclear missile submarines] retain practically intact (at least according to their assessments) the potential not only for a retaliatory strike but also a counterforce strike against Russia's land-based strategic offensive weapons. Whereas Russia's patrolling strategic submarines, which are exclusively a means of delivering a retaliatory strike (the Americans themselves acknowledge this) and, furthermore, are the main means of doing so, are constantly in the sights of the U.S. ASW forces and systems—at least, even if not all of them are, 30-40 percent are in that situation. The remainder, at their bases, are in range of the grouping of counterforce strike systems.

I do not deny that such arguments are determined specifically by the confrontational syndrome of Cold War times, a syndrome which has not entirely been overcome. But it surely cannot be denied that grounds for such fears still exist.

To clarify matters fully, let me add here that I am an active supporter of the ratification of the START II Treaty (after the resolution of the problems with other CIS countries with nuclear weapons on their territory, of course). Thus all the arguments and suggestions which follow should not be regarded as additional conditions for the ratification of this treaty although, in my opinion, even their partial implementation would increase its effectiveness, determine further steps in the reduction of strategic offensive arms, and ultimately enhance strategic stability and international security.

What is to be done, therefore? Capt First Rank A. Demchenko proposes beginning "the negotiation process... perhaps... even the conclusion of a separate treaty (by analogy with the 1972 ABM Treaty) to restrict the potential of national ASW systems." It is not hard to foresee the Americans' counterarguments. For external consumption they will say: We cannot accept the attempts to restrict the principle of the freedom of the open seas for ASW forces (although when this is in its interests the United States does not hesitate to impose such restrictions by establishing no-go zones covering

almost half the Atlantic, an area of 5 miles around its ships, and so forth). But for internal consumption they will say that these restrictions will be advantageous only to the Russians, ignoring the fact that the Americans themselves also gain both economically and strategically from the strengthening of confidence and stability in relations between the two countries—this is a gain for the Americans directly and for the whole world, which will become safer.

It must also be borne in mind that the ASW forces of the United States and its NATO allies (submarines, land-based patrol aircraft, stationary hydroacoustic systems, and hydroacoustic intelligence ships) operate not only against our strategic missile-armed craft but also against multipurpose submarines. In addition, their multipurpose submarines are engaged off our coasts not only in tracking missile-armed craft but also in performing other tasks: keeping the activity of the Russian Navy under surveillance, being in a state of readiness to deliver strikes against land-based and sea-based installations with cruise missiles and torpedoes (with conventional charges), placing mines near the fleet's base stations, and directly blockading the Russian Navy in its base regions. Finally, by tracking our SSBNs the U.S. and NATO ASW forces compel Russia to divert a considerable proportion of the Navy to maintaining the combat survivability of missile-armed craft, thereby seriously limiting the potential for combat actions by that section of the fleet.

It is doubtful that the United States would abandon all this to increase the security of our strategic missile-armed craft. Although if an ASW treaty had been concluded, this really would be evidence of a sufficiently high level of confidence. Nevertheless it would have been a treaty deriving from confrontational thinking, and a refusal to implement it or individual violations of it would have been a very simple matter, whereas verification would have been very difficult. Such a treaty, if one existed, could be made more reliable by an agreement to give Russia access to America's stationary hydroacoustic systems for observing submarine movements in the Atlantic and the Pacific. After all, the sides have agreed on "open land" and "open skies." Why not reach agreement on "open ocean" in the same sense?

Nevertheless, this path seems highly unlikely to me. There are more radical solutions which seem more realistic.

The abandonment of SSBNs as one element of the strategic triad, to be implemented in several stages while retaining the maximum number of ICBMs per side, is one solution—possibly within the framework of a future START III treaty or on the basis of agreed unilateral actions. The point of this proposal is primarily to do away with submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which are increasingly becoming a destabilizing factor and contain the risk of fatal error. After all, the U.S. Trident systems can carry up to 336 warheads, the Russian Typhoons 200: Thus, the destruction of one SSBN is

equivalent to the withdrawal from service of nearly 34 MX ICBMs or 20 SS-18 ICBMs.

In my view, the renunciation of SSBNs as elements of the strategic triad could proceed by the following stages:

- the reduction of the number of missile-armed craft on patrol to a level where the nuclear warheads on them are sufficient to deliver an effective counterforce strike;
- the reduction of the number of missile-armed craft in the forces on permanent readiness by the verifiable removal of ballistic missiles from them;
- the salvage or refitting of missile-armed craft removed from the combat force level under a special timetable;
- the involvement in this process of other countries armed with SSBNs.

The implementation of the first two stages could begin even during the fulfillment of the START I Treaty. But the complete implementation of these proposals will of course require the solution of the problem of sea-launched, nuclear-armed cruise missiles, which must obviously be scrapped.

I realize that my suggestions are unusual. But I think that their implementation would help to resolve some of the anomalies in the START II Treaty, consolidate strategic stability, strengthen confidence between Russia and the United States, and develop cooperation among the nuclear states.

SDI, SPACE ARMS, GLOBAL DEFENSE

Russia Comments on SDI

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Welcomes Aspin Statement

LD1605124893 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1200 GMT 16 May 93

[Text] Moscow, 16 May (ITAR-TASS)—In connection with the statement by U.S. Secretary of Defense L. Aspin on 13 May on the question of the future of the SDI program, a spokesman of the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement today.

It says: "We perceive this statement as a step in the right direction, testifying to a positive evolution of the American approach to questions of maintaining and strengthening strategic stability. In particular, one cannot fail to welcome the U.S.' tactical rejection of the more destabilizing element of the odious 'Star Wars' program—offensive space armaments. The irrational nature of maintaining this program has become particularly evident in light of the conclusion of the START II Treaty, which essentially removes the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict between the United States and Russia. There is also no doubt that this step by America is a specific expression of the Russian-American relationship

as partners, one which has had a powerful boost as a result of the recent summit meeting in Vancouver.

"I would also like, in this connection, to reaffirm our unaltered commitment to the ABM Treaty of 1972," the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman stated.

Commentary Says 'Step in the Right Direction'

LD1705134193 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 17 May 93

[Commentary by Yuriy Solton on U.S. decision to abandon Strategic Defense Initiative]

[Text] A step in the right direction—that is how the Russian Foreign Ministry has assessed the decision of the U.S. Administration to abandon the development and deployment in space of antimissile defense systems. This commentary is by our observer Yuriy Solton.

For the past 10 years, work has been going on the program known as the Strategic Defense Initiative, SDI, or the Star Wars program, as Senator Edward Kennedy called it. The then president, Ronald Reagan, proposed creating the space antimissile shield over the United States in March of 1983. Incidentally, he has now become one of the few critics of the announcement by the Clinton administration.

The United States has spent \$30 billion on implementing the program. It is not known how much the former Soviet Union had spent on countermeasures, dissimilar ones, as was said, but adequate. It can be safely assumed that it was large. But the main thing is that the SDI and the anti-SDI programs, although technical problems could not be totally solved, threatened to carry the arms race to outer space and built up tension in the relations between the two superpowers.

After the breakup of the USSR, when its successor, Russia, turned to relations of partnership with the United States, the Star Wars program became an anachronism. As the Russian Foreign Ministry has stressed in a statement, it is surely a welcome move that the United States has actually given up these space armaments, which are the most destabilizing element of the Star Wars program. The decision of the Washington administration indicates the growth in confidence in the Russian-American relations, which were promoted again after a recent summit in Vancouver between Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton.

Another contributing factor was the signing of a Russian-American treaty to reduce by two-thirds the strategic nuclear forces of the two countries, which actually reduces the danger of a nuclear conflict between them.

But still, the request of the administration to the U.S. Congress remains in force about setting aside \$3.8 billion in the coming fiscal year, from October, to deploying antimissile defense systems known as ABM systems. There are plans to develop a defense system against short-range ballistic missiles and at the second

stage to develop a ground-based system of defense on the territory of the United States against intercontinental ballistic missiles. In the latter case, the 1972 ABM Treaty will be effected. This treaty allows the United States and Russia to have only one area of such defense, with a radius of 150 km where no more than 100 antimissiles should be deployed. The Russian Foreign Ministry has reaffirmed Moscow's compliance with the ABM Treaty.

In this regard there is one important point. Last summer, Russia and the United States agreed at top level to set up a global system of defense against ballistic missiles. Work is already underway amongst groups of experts, including the involvement of other countries. Action on such a program would create not only for Russia and the United States but for other countries, too, reliable protection against accidental, nonendorsed, or terrorist launches of nuclear missiles. Anyway, positive changes are taking place in maintaining and strengthening strategic stability with the emphasis not on the arms race but on cutting arms and creating collective defense systems.

Russian Parliament Sets Space Policy

PM1705111793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 12 May 93 First Edition p 5

[Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Statement No. 4879-1 "On the Priorities of Russian Federation Space Policy" dated Moscow, Russian House of Soviets, 27 April 1993]

[Text] For over 30 years space science in our country has served the interests of the state. Without it, communications and television broadcasting, navigation and meteorology, surveying and cartography, and many other sectors of the national economy would be inconceivable. Space technologies are something no progressive power can do without. It is hard to overestimate the importance of space systems in maintaining the country's defense capability.

Realizing its responsibility for preserving Russia's space potential and the extensive application of this potential in resolving the pressing problems of citizens and society as a whole, the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet considers it necessary to state the priorities of space policy which are to be enshrined in Russian Federation legislation and consistently implemented in the day-to-day practice of the state administration of space activity.

1. Space activity in the Russian Federation is to be implemented with a view to ensuring the prosperity of citizens, the development of the Russian Federation, the strengthening of its security, and also resolving the global problems of humanity.

Russian space science should ensure:

—the equal right of Russian Federation enterprises, organizations, and citizens to participate in space activity and enjoy its results;

—access to information about space activity;

—restriction of monopolies and the development of entrepreneurial activity;

—independent expert analysis of space projects and programs;

—safety in space activity, including the protection of the environment.

2. Russia's federal space program is being organized in line with the requirements and economic resources of society and the state.

National economic space projects should be designed to tackle tasks with the greatest socioeconomic impact, primarily in the development of networks for receiving, processing, and transmitting information, communications, television broadcasting, environmental monitoring, and studying natural resources.

Work of an exploratory nature enabling fundamentally new tasks to be set and tackled, and also applied work commissioned by specific consumers, should be given priority in scientific space research.

Space activity for military purposes should be concentrated primarily on the use of space systems for military command and control, communications, intelligence, and other types of backup for the Armed Forces.

3. Structural transformations in space science are to be implemented taking into account the specific features of space science and industry and include the flotation and privatization of profitable production facilities. At the same time unique testing [stendovyy] equipment, and also space infrastructure installations with state significance, should remain within state ownership and be made available for use by interested enterprises and organizations.

During the economic reforms it is extremely important not to forfeit the intellectual property of enterprises, organizations, and citizens by taking part in space hardware and space technology developments.

The specific features of space activity—the intermingling of science and production, the protracted investment cycle and high degree of commercial risk, the difficulty of obtaining a direct return on invested capital, and the close link between domestic and foreign capital—require special economic approaches. Taking world experience into account, it is necessary to formulate a special system for granting loans to, levying taxes on, and offering state guarantees to enterprises and organizations working on space projects.

Strengthening Russia's positions in the world space market presupposes attracting foreign investment backed up by appropriate state guarantees, and also guarantees employing funds from the Russian enterprises and organizations concerned.

4. The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet favors cooperation in opening up space with CIS member countries and the preservation and development of established scientific and production ties. Further steps must be taken to implement the Minsk Agreement on Joint Action To Study and Exploit Space, primarily as regards mechanisms for adopting mutually advantageous interstate space projects and their shared financing by the states, enterprises, and organizations concerned.

5. In issues of international relations connected with space activity, state policy is designed to support domestic enterprises and organizations, deepen international cooperation and integration in opening up space on a mutually advantageous basis, and ensure the fulfillment of Russia's obligations under international agreements.

[Signed] The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet

Moscow, the Russian House of Soviets, 27 April 1993

No. 4879-1

Russian Decree on Space Science and Industry

PM1305122793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 12 May 93 First Edition p 5

[Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Decree No. 4878-1 "On Measures to Stabilize the Situation in Space Science and Industry", signed by R.I. Khasbulatov, chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, and dated Moscow, 27 April 1993]

[Text] With a view to preserving the intellectual, economic, and defense potential of space science and industry, the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet decrees that:

1. The Russian Federation Government shall:

make provision in the Russian Federation's draft budgetary system for the next financial year for appropriations to be allocated to the Russian space program as a separate line item [otdelnoy strokoy] to be indexed quarterly;

submit to the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet by 1 June 1993 the draft Russian Federal Space Program for space systems, complexes, and means with scientific, economic, and defense roles;

define the Russian Space Agency as the state customer for space systems, complexes, and means with scientific and economic roles, and—in conjunction with the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense—for space systems, complexes, and means used for both civilian and military purposes;

stipulate the direct allocation to the Russian Space Agency of appropriations for research and development work, the purchase and operation of space equipment, capital construction, the maintenance of ground-based

space infrastructure installations, and other work under the Russian Federal Space Program to be carried out by the Russian Space Agency;

supply space projects financed out of the Russian Federation budget—specifically, space systems, complexes, and means with scientific and economic roles—with raw and other materials, equipment, components, and other material and technical resources under the procedure stipulated for state orders for arms and military equipment in accordance with the Russian Federation law "On Deliveries of Output and Goods for State Needs";

define a procedure for promoting the implementation of space projects using the funds of enterprises, organizations, and citizens, including the granting to them of state guarantees, soft loans, tax concessions, and other necessary measures;

elaborate a program of structural transformations in space science and industry, including the creation of federal space centers based on leading design bureaus and scientific research institutes as well as holding and joint-stock companies, taking account of their targeted financing, including funding from conversion funds;

examine the remuneration system for people employed in the space complex, taking account of the Unified Wage System and average pay levels in the Russian Federation;

elaborate a plan for the further utilization of ground-based space infrastructure installations—primarily the Plesetsk Space Center—taking account of the socioeconomic aspects of the development of the regions in question;

take measures to strengthen social protection for space center workers and specialists at enterprises and organizations engaged in the testing and operation of space equipment;

take the necessary measures to preserve the existing science and production links in the sphere of space activity in the CIS, including consultations with the Republic of Kazakhstan to clarify the status of and prospects for the further joint use of the Baykonur Space Center;

elaborate and ensure implementation of a unified scientific, technical, and economic policy when concluding and executing international agreements on space research and the use of space, including commercial space projects.

2. The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet of the Republic Commission for Transport, Communications, Information Technology, and Space, jointly with the Russian Space Agency, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and other interested departments, shall prepare proposals for the creation of a Russian Space Fund as an independent organization to concentrate funding from internal and external sources with a view to stimulating basic research, forming financial insurance reserves,

introducing space technology into the national economy, and supporting measures to utilize the achievements of space science for public education and cultural purposes.

3. The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations, jointly with interested chamber standing commissions and Russian Federation Supreme Soviet committees, shall prepare materials on international agreements in the sphere of space activity with the participation of the Russian Federation for examination by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet.

4. A provisional deputies' group of representatives from interested chamber standing commissions and Russian Federation Supreme Soviet committees shall be set up with a view to strengthening parliamentary control of space activity.

The group's work shall be organized by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet of the Republic Commission for Transport, Communications, Information Technology, and Space.

[Signed] R.I. Khasbulatov, chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet

[Dated] Moscow, House of the Soviets of Russia, 27 April 1993

No. 4878-1

Interstate Space Council Discusses Cooperation in Kiev

*LD1305083893 Kiev UKRINFORM in Ukrainian
1525 GMT 12 May 93*

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Oleksiy Petrunya]

[Text] [No dateline as received]—Issues of cooperation in mastering the expanse of space are being discussed by participants in a session of the Interstate Space Council [Mizhderzhavna Rada po Kosmosu], which opened in Kiev on 12 May. The center of attention is the validation of an interstate space program for this year, the discussion of draft agreements on the Executive Committee of the Interstate Space Council, and on its budget, and the procedure of making mutual payments and ensuring the clearance of mutual payments between states.

Heads of national space research and exploitation agencies from Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine put forward their concepts of cooperation.

Volodymyr Horbulin, director general of the National Space Agency of Ukraine, told a UKRINFORM correspondent the following:

"Our agency is only one year old. In that period of time, organizational issues have been settled and a number of government decisions have been adopted on developing space research for purposes of the national economy.

"Our main objective now is to reorient space programs toward solely civilian requirements and those of the national economy. The registration of enterprises and organizations of our country has been carried out in respect of their readiness to supply the needs of space research. Principles of a national space program have been worked out. Among them is the creation of our own space equipment, the development of links with the former USSR republics, the integration in the activity of the world community in researching and exploiting the expanse of space, and the introduction of mixed financing of the program, i.e. not only drawing in budgetary funds but also the capital of commercial structures".

The aim of the Interstate Space Council in the first place is to develop cooperation between the former Soviet Union republics and to draw up a joint concept, Volodymyr Horbulin noted. For example, Ukraine is allocating 36 billion karbovantsi to space programs, with 11 billion out of that amount for the implementation of the interstate program.

"Working together, we shall be able to do more for our countries and their economies," the director general stressed.

The session's final documents will be presented at a meeting between the CIS heads of state, though maybe not at the next one but in a meeting. After all, quite a lot of details in joint documents still need to be finalized.

Ukraine Joins World Space Agency Forum

*LD1005204393 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1800 GMT 10 May 93*

[Text] The Ukrainian National Space Agency [Natsionalne Kosmichne Ahenstvo Ukrainy] is actively establishing international cooperation. In particular, last month work continued on formulating the interstate space program for CIS countries. In this regard, working conferences with representatives of the Russian Space Agency and the Air and Space Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan have been held with regard to further collaboration.

Experts from the Ukrainian National Space Agency took part in the world forum of space agencies held in Rome, side by side with representatives of 40 countries of the world. The Ukrainian National Space Agency was accepted as a member of the forum side by side with the American NASA, the French CNES, the European Space Agency, and other organizations.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Russia's Flanks Seen Weakened by CFE Treaty

*MK0805093093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
No. 14, 7 May 93 (Signed to Press 6 May) p 3*

[Pavel Felgengauer report: "CFE Treaty Needs Correction Again. Western Democracies Express Understanding and Sympathy, But This Does Not Solve the Problem of Russian Flank Quotas"]

[Text] The limitations imposed on the Air Forces and Armies of European countries by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) are to come into force in 1995. At present, however, it is already clear that strict compliance with the treaty in its present form may create significant difficulties for Russia.

In 1990, when the USSR still existed, the redeployment of troops and weapons systems on the eve of the signing of CFE in Paris (November 1990) robbed Russia of the best divisions, which were transferred to the jurisdiction of Ukraine and Belarus. Under the additional Tashkent Protocol of 1992 Russia is to cut down its weapons systems in the European part of the country to 6,400 tanks, 11,480 armored combat vehicles (ACV), 6,415 artillery systems, 3,450 combat aircraft; and 890 combat helicopters, which is entirely sufficient for defensive purposes. Quotas for the flanks, however—the Leningrad Military District and the North Caucasus Military District—are clearly set too low, particularly with regard to ACVs (with the ceiling of 580 vehicles in regular units for either district).

The North Caucasus alone needs a much greater number of ACVs both to keep peace inside the country and to protect new borders. There are at present three and a half motorized rifle divisions subordinated to the Russian Internal Affairs Ministry in the region, and an Internal Affairs Ministry Border Troops district is under formation along with the North Caucasian Border Troops district of the Russian Security Ministry. Units and military formations from Transcaucasia and the Baltic states are being moved to the North Caucasian Military District, which has turned from a rear district into a front-line district, and new "light" brigades of the rapid deployment forces are being set up.

In the Leningrad Military District, on the opposite flank, the situation is now stable, but it is essential to foresee the possible heightening of tensions in the northeastern, predominantly Russian-speaking region of Estonia, territorial claims laid by Estonia to Russian territories, and also the problem of massive smuggling of strategic materials via new Russian borders. For should the situation deteriorate sharply, it is precisely ACVs that will be needed for pacification and reinforced border patrols.

It should be said that Moscow-based military and diplomatic representatives of the key Western powers are aware of the "flank" problem; furthermore, they privately express diplomatic "understanding and sympathy regarding the complex situation that has taken shape in the Northern Caucasus." A military attache from one of the NATO countries told your SEGODNYA correspondent that "Russia should announce the existence of a serious problem with regard to "flank" quotas and try to persuade Western public opinion to acknowledge in public and not only via diplomatic channels that its stance is justified."

CFE, however, is only one of a whole range of agreements on disarmament and the withdrawal of troops of

the former USSR which have, being in principle fully reasonable, nonetheless put Russia in general and its armed forces in particular in an extremely awkward position. It turned out that Soviet-trained diplomats lack any interest in dealing with the "small" technical details of the already signed agreements and are completely unprepared for this task. Specialists from the Defense Ministry and the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, for their part, are unable, as the experience of the past few years shows, to foresee possible political developments in the country and in adjacent regions. The customary practice whereby documents had to be agreed upon by various ministries and departments does not work in the new conditions, either.

Given the current situation in the Russian top echelons, what remains to be done is to set up a new federal department (ministry) to renegotiate ("clarify") the agreements that have already been concluded (CFE, SALT, the Convention on Chemical Weapons, various treaties on the withdrawal of troops, on collective security and so forth).

Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian defense minister, already said at a press conference at the beginning of March 1993 that "owing to changes in the situation, we need new quotas: Weapons will have to be moved from one district to another while keeping the agreed general ceiling intact." There is no doubt, however, that much more will need to be done: Official statements should be made at the top level, this issue should be included in the agendas of all summits, and so forth. In this event, the "flank" problem may be substantially resolved by the time Russia gets around to reviewing other treaties, too.

Estonian Report on Talks With Russia on Military Withdrawal

*LD1205182093 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network
in Estonian 1600 GMT 12 May 93*

[Text] Another round of Estonian-Russian talks began today in Lohusalu. The work started in the morning with a plenary session for the delegations and discussions have continued in all four working groups.

Minister Juri Luik, leader of the Estonian delegation, stated again that the Estonian delegation's main attention at this round of talks is focused on the Russian troop withdrawal. He said that today, indeed, the most noteworthy discussion had taken place in the military working group, where the deadline for the Russian troop withdrawal from Paldiski had been debated. Unfortunately, the Russian delegation's positions on this matter have remained the same. The years 1998 and 1999 are being offered as deadlines, with the willingness to remove the nuclear equipment within the next year. The Estonian side has not gone back on its position that the Russian troops must be withdrawn completely from Estonia by the end of 1993. This should also be technically feasible for the Russian side.

Regarding economic issues, Luik highlighted discussions about the \$80 million belonging to Estonia which is frozen in Moscow. According to him, Russia has not yet abandoned delaying tactics, and for this reason the final solution may be postponed until later if matters continue like this.

Latvian-Russian Cooperation Back on Track

Russian Residency Decree Revised

*WS1305144393 Tallinn BNS in English 1501 GMT
12 May 93*

[Text] Moscow, May 12, BNS—Russia and Latvia agreed to resume their negotiations in Jurmala nearly one month after the Russians boycotted a scheduled meeting.

Russian ambassador Sergey Zotov said the countries should sign several agreements related to the withdrawal of the Russian forces during the May 17-20 negotiations. The parties will proceed with the basic treaty on troop withdrawal and discuss a number of other agreements. In particular, are those concerning social security of servicemen, military pensioners and members of their families.

The announcement of the meeting comes just three weeks after aborted meeting scheduled for April 26-27. The day the meeting was to open the Russian delegation announced it would not show in protest of a temporary stay bill under consideration by the Latvian parliament. The bill required limited residency permits for people related to the Russian army in Latvia.

The bill drew sharp criticism from Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Yeltsin said the bill provided the basis for ethnic cleansing in Latvia. The bill in its original form would have affected 75,000 - 200,000 people.

At that time, head of the Russian delegation declared that he saw no sense in conducting the next round of negotiations under a situation where the Latvian parliament is discussing documents "laying the legal ground for further deportation of tens of thousands of the ethnic Russians."

On April 28 Latvia's parliament adopted a "soft" version of a decree on interim residence permit for Russian servicemen.

Talks To Resume 17-20 May

*WS1305140993 Tallinn BNS in English 2018 GMT
12 May 93*

[Text] Riga, May 12, BNS—The postponed round of Latvian-Russian interstate talks resumes May 17-20 in the Latvian resort town of Jurmala, Ilgonis Upmalis, head of the bureau monitoring the Russian troops withdrawal, told BNS Wednesday.

The head of the Russian delegation, Ambassador-at-Large Sergey Zotov, is authorized to sign five of 11 initialed interstate documents, Upmalis said.

Russia says it would also like to continue with the discussions in Moscow later this month to tackle the issue on troop withdrawal by the end of 1994.

Upmalis says the date is a realistic deadline for the troops withdrawal, since there are still several major military installations on the Latvian territory that cannot be removed earlier.

The coming round of talks was first scheduled for April 26, but the Russian delegation did not arrive, citing its disapproval of a bill on the temporary residency permits for Russian servicemen.

NATO States Endorse Baltic Bid To Speed Russian Withdrawal

*WS1305141793 Tallinn BNS in English 2018 GMT
12 May 93*

[Text] Riga, May 12, BNS—NATO member-states for the first time unequivocally endorsed the Baltic's claim to speed up the Russian troop withdrawal from the Baltic region.

The statement came during a Warsaw seminar of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly May 4-7.

Unlike its Baltic sisters, Lithuania voiced no claims regarding the process of the Russian troops withdrawal. The Latvian delegation alleged that it is connected with Moscow, trying to use the new Lithuanian government as a wedge to hamper the army pullout from the Baltics.

The Latvian delegation says there are different attitudes among Western countries regarding the troops withdrawal. Sweden demands a complete and speedy withdrawal, while Germany urges observers to take into account interests of Russia as a major power.

In addition, the NATO seminar discussed the situation in the Kaliningrad region for military purposes in the future.

The Russian delegation to the seminar says that with favorable conditions for the development of democracy in Russia, the number of army divisions in the Kaliningrad region might be cut to one division instead of the present four.

Participants to the seminar categorically refused to accept Poland to the European Community and NATO.

Latvia was represented to the seminar by MPs Michail Stepichev, Peteris Simsons and Janis Krums.

Baltics Participate in Talks With Russia*WS1305141393 Tallinn BNS in English 2018 GMT
12 May 93*

[Text] Vilnius, May 12, BNS—Leaders of Estonian and Latvian defense ministries were invited to a meeting of Lithuanian and Russian defense ministers in Vilnius, scheduled for May 16-18, said Audrius Butkevicius.

The principal aim of Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev's visit to Lithuania is to find "efficient and timely" solutions to the problems of the Russian army withdrawal, said Butkevicius.

Lithuania and Russia will also confirm the results of work done by joint expert groups to coordinate the pull out, he said.

The Lithuanian minister said Grachev's visit will be "exceptional." On the one hand, the meeting will show the level of Lithuanian-Russian relations; on the other hand, it will allow the Lithuania's Baltic neighbors to speed up the coordination of the troop withdrawal from their own territories.

Butkevicius said around 11,800 Russian men are still present in Lithuania, which is a "minimum" for the technical side of the pullout.

**CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS****Russian Conference Debates Chemical Weapons
Destruction***PM1405133893 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1000 GMT 13 May 93*

[From the "Vesti" newscast: Video report by A. Peslyak, identified by caption; figures in brackets denote broadcast time in GMT in hours, minutes, and seconds]

[Text] [100501] Today in Moscow there opened the first Russian conference on medical and ecological problems of the destruction of chemical weapons. Taking part are scientists, chemists, biologists, doctors, specialists of various departments. They will discuss how safely, beginning in 1995, to destroy over 40,000 tonnes of mustard gas, lewisite, and other toxins. After all, Russia recently signed the international convention. Civilian and military experts have been complementing each other for dozens of years and prevented any incidents or the appearances of a chemical Chernobyl but the stocks remain. In destroying them we are concerned primarily for people's health, that is the weapons' destroyers and the population in the regions where there are establishments, depots, and plants. The environment must also be preserved. Let us add that a lack of knowledge of the real situation often gives rise to stories and fears, and more active work with the population and the local authorities by all our secret departments is called on to

struggle against a kind of chemical phobia. [100557] [video shows chemical establishments, soldiers, conference delegates]

Estonia Ratifies Ban on Bacteriological Weapons*LD0605120793 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network
in Estonian 1700 GMT 5 May 93*

[Excerpt] The Riigikogu worked a long time today. Today the cooperation and friendship treaty between the Republic of Estonia and Ukraine was ratified, as well as the convention on exchanging official publications and government documents between countries, and the law, presented by the government, on joining the convention on the ban on improving, producing, and procuring bacteriological and toxic weapons and the destruction thereof. [passage omitted]

**Baltic Chemical Weapons Disposal Sites Being
Charted***LD1405203393 Moscow Ostankino Television First
Channel Network in Russian 1400 GMT 14 May 93*

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Russia and other Baltic Sea countries intend to compile a map of sites where chemical weapons have been buried in the Baltic Sea in the period since World War II. Experts report that an assessment will be also be made of possible damage to the environment. A special group of experts has already been set up which will carry out this work.

**Environmentalists Condemn Mirzayanov
Prosecution***93WC0062A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No 15, 11 Apr 93 p A6*

[Letter by S. Fomichev, chairman of organizational committee for "Social and Ecological Aspects of the Destruction of Chemical Weapons" Conference; V. Alekseyev, chairman of Chuvash Republic Greens Party; V. Petrov, Movement "For Removal of Chemical Weapons," Kambarka, Udmurt Republic; V. Gergel, editor of newspaper SOLNECHNAYA GORA, Solnechnogorsk, Moscow Oblast; S. Kamenskiy, deputy of Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast Soviet; et al (a total of 15 signatures), under rubric "Position": "International Conference in Moscow Is Impossible Until Authorities Cease Prosecuting Those Fighting Against Chemical Weapons"]

[Text] On 22 October 1992 the Russian Ministry of Security arrested Doctor of Chemical Sciences Vil Mirzayanov and then released him on recognizance not to leave. The ground for this was an article by him and L. Fedorov entitled "Poisoned Policy" criticizing a number of actions by official authorities in chemical armament of Russia which are especially intolerable in anticipation of the signing of the Convention on Chemical Disarmament. It is already the sixth month that security entities

have been conducting an investigation with respect to Mirzayanov allegedly for divulging state secrets entrusted through his work. The prosecution is being carried out not on the basis of openly published laws, but on the basis of secret instructions contradicting the law and principles of a rule-of-law state.

Neither Mirzayanov nor his lawyer were familiarized with the list of military-chemical secrets, if such exists.

On 23 February 1993, right after Russia signed the Convention on Chemical Disarmament, Saratov Oblast security entities began prosecuting Volsk resident Vladimir Ulev, one of the past creators of new forms of chemical weapons, for allegedly divulging state secrets. At the present time they are attempting to deprive him of parliamentary privilege in order to begin an investigation. Finally, in late March the recall procedure also was applied with respect to Vladimir Petrenko, a former worker at the Shikhany Military-Chemical Range, where a model of the latest chemical weapon was tested in 1982.

The abuse of power with respect to Mirzayanov, Ulev and Petrenko is not just a revival of the practice of criminal prosecution for political convictions; it is obvious evidence of preserved omnipotence of the military-chemical complex and of state security acting in its interests. The prosecution of Mirzayanov, Ulev and Petrenko is especially inappropriate after the majority of world countries signed the Convention on Chemical Disarmament, thereby having undertaken not to keep any military-chemical secrets, real or imaginary, from each other.

In May of this year General A. Kuntsevich, chairman of the Committee on Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons under the Russian Federation President, is convening an international chemical disarmament conference in Moscow.

We believe that participation of Russian scientists, regional representatives and the public in this conference can be justified on ethical considerations only with unconditional cessation of the prosecution of Mirzayanov, Ulev and Petrenko.

There should be no place for double standards in chemical disarmament as well as in the entire life of the present Russia.

The sorry practice of 20th Century Russian history, where some were forced to talk with investigators while others meanwhile pretended that nothing reprehensible was occurring, cannot be repeated.

We are for the unconditional right to live without military-chemical secrets and political persecutions.

WEAPONS CONVERSION

Kurchatov Institute Involved in New 'Majestic' Projects

LD0805170293 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1100 GMT 8 May 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Excerpt] Everyone gets out of a crisis in their own way. The Kurchatov Institute, the Russian nuclear research center, is proving that Russian science is extremely viable. On the eve of its 50th anniversary, development work has started simultaneously on two majestic projects. One is traditional, a thermonuclear reactor and a follow-on to the Tokamak idea, which will be created in conjunction with the United States, Japan, and the European Community.

The second project is the conversion of the Navy's atomic fleet and the transfer of the energies of militarization to developing Russia's maritime shelf. Leading military research centers and the Rubin, Malakhit, and Lazurit design offices, the Krylov Institute, and Prometey are involved with the Kurchatov Institute on this project. Platforms for drilling and extracting oil and gas from the shelf are to be built at the Severodvinsk machinebuilding works instead of atomic submarines.

Investments in this project will make it possible not only to provide more jobs but also to stabilize the ruble in the opinion of the project's initiators. They reckon that three, four, or five of these global projects could have a fundamental impact on the recovery of the Russian economy, and the results should be felt by everyone not in 10-15 years' time, as is usually the case in our country, but from the moment that the projects begin to be implemented. [Video shows northern port scenes; control console; Velikhov holding up further diagram]

NATO To Fund Ukrainian Science Projects

LD1705162293 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1500 GMT 16 May 93

[Text] Ukrainian experts have prepared and submitted 120 projects for participation in the international competitive program "Science for Stability" initiated by NATO's Science Committee. Projects developed by Ukrainian specialists concern such important aspects of activity [words indistinct] as nuclear arms elimination, the conducting of conversion at military sector enterprises, and guaranteeing the safety of atomic power stations.

Ukrainian scientists hope to receive five to seven percent of the funds out of the \$30 million earmarked by NATO's Science Committee for this program, primarily for those projects which are of foremost significance for Ukraine. These are: Elimination of the Chernobyl disaster's aftermath, renewal of the Dnieper ecological system, the Danube, and the Black and the Azov Seas.

FRANCE

Paris Poised To Resume Nuclear Testing

PM0505164593 Paris *LE MONDE* in French 4 May 93
p 14

[Unattributed report: "Atomic Energy Commission Is Poised To Resume Nuclear Tests After July"]

[Text] The leaders of the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) believe that the resumption of nuclear tests by France is "a necessity" for the national deterrent. It believes that these tests are "irreplaceable" and hopes for "a rapid decision" in favor from the government after Francois Mitterrand's decision to suspend blasts until July, like the Americans and Russians. The CEA has already taken steps "for the possible resumption of tests in the second half of 1993."

That essentially is what was stated by Philippe Rouvillois and Roger Baleras, respectively CEA general administrator and director of military applications, when they were heard at the end of last week by the deputies of the National Assembly defense commission. The two men explained that the resumption of tests on the Mururoa atoll were "to the forefront of their concerns."

For the first time the general administrator gave a tally of the number of French nuclear tests from their beginning through the unilateral moratorium in April 1992, that is 161 tests as against 961 in the United States and 657 in the former Soviet Union. So far that number had been secret and the details published here and there in France had never been authenticated by the CEA. Employing a staff of 6,000, the military applications department received a budget of 9 billion francs [Fr] for 1993, mostly from the Defense Ministry. Since 1988, according to Mr Rouvillois, this budget has declined by 27 percent or even 30 percent if you take account of the Fr320 million reduction in early 1993. Since 1988 the military applications department has had some 5,000 resignations.

The CEA general administrator specified for the first time that the production of plutonium for defense needs stopped in 1992 and that there would be a sufficiency of enriched uranium in a few years. Which will pose problems (final disposal, reprocessing of stored waste, dismantling of installations, financial costs, and manpower numbers) in connection with the gradual shutdown of the Marcoule and Pierrelatte sites in the Southeast.

A Weapon With Controllable Yield

"From the scientific and technical viewpoint," Mr Rouvillois stated with regard to weapons, "the resumption of the tests is a necessity for maintaining the nuclear deterrence research and development tools. For today tests are essential to validate concepts and calculations. A rapid decision, which is of course a matter for the government, is very desirable."

For his part Mr Baleras emphasized "the irreplaceable nature of nuclear testing, which is a real laboratory physical experiment which, of course, could not be done on the same scale on the territory of the mother country." He noted that the CEA has drawn up the PALEN (preparation for limiting nuclear tests) plan, which consists in finalizing means and techniques of simulation but does not do away with full-scale tests. Whether it is a matter of computer modeling techniques or of high-powered lasers, any simulation according to the military applications department boss, implies waiting periods, credits, and the continuation of tests—albeit a limited number—in order for technicians to "validate the models' relevance and adjust the simulation parameters."

Mr Baleras gave the deputies new details about the long-range air to surface missile which is to be the future second nuclear component alongside the missiles installed on submarines. The long-range air to surface missile will be installed on the Rafale and Britain has been invited by France to join this major program.

The military applications department boss noted that it will be a question of developing a warhead unique to the long-range air to surface missile and that "this weapons system will probably involve a controllable yield." Which means that, like some U.S. arms, the warhead will have a destructive power whose effects will vary depending on the effect it is expected to have on the target.

(As soon as they were made known, the statements by the CEA leaders gave rise to a response from the New Zealand government issued by prime minister Jim Bolger, who said he would be "very disappointed" if France resumes its tests in the Pacific. "We shall make our viewpoint known to France," Mr Bolger added. For its part Greenpeace noted that in Auckland that it is prepared to send a ship to Mururoa if France resumes its blasts).

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